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This research seeks to analyze the variability in participation across legislators at the state 
level and to consider the potential consequences of participatory behavior. In this dissertation, I 
draw on theories of political participation, legislative goals, and state political institutions to 
explain participation in state legislative activities.  To begin with, I examine legislative 
participation across the legislative process, considering the determinants of sponsorship and roll-
call participation.  Next, I examine the consequences that participation has for legislators 
focusing on challenger emergence in the general election. My research demonstrates that 
legislative participation varies systematically across individual, institutional, and state level 
variables.  However, final results indicate that participatory variables do not condition challenger 
emergence in the general election.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Eighty percent of success is showing up. 
  - Woody Allen 
 
This dissertation explores the question of the determinants and political consequences of 
legislative activity.  While much attention has been paid to how legislators participate and the 
political choices that they make—in the form of sponsorship and cosponsorship, committee 
debate, and roll call voting—less attention has been paid to the antecedent question of whether 
legislators participate.  How much of success is "showing up" in the legislative arena?  And what 
does "showing up" entail? 
This question of political participation is crucial, but much of what we know about the 
choice to participate comes not from studies of elite politics but from studies of turnout in the 
mass public.  Dating back to Riker and Ordeshook's classic theory of turnout (1968), political 
scientists have argued that the decision to participate depends in part on the benefits of 
participation (defined in various ways), in part on the costs, and in part on the probability that 
one's participation may make a difference.  Such a perspective can be applied to legislative 
politics; given the increasing workload that legislators face, time has become a valuable resource 
to any legislator (Moncrief, Thompson, and Kurtz 1996; Squire 1992). The decision to 
participate in any one legislative activity entails trade-offs, and an assessment of costs and 
benefits.  Of course, legislators have a different array of possible ways in which they can 
participate than do individuals in the mass public, and are generally considered to be better 
informed about any consequences of their decision to participate.  These differences between the 
mass and the elite level suggest that we may be better able to explain participation at the elite 




The first set of questions, therefore, that this dissertation seeks to answer is "Who 
participates?  How do they participate?  And (most important) what factors explain the decision 
to participate?  Borrowing terminology from Uslander (1998), who are the “movers and shirkers” 
in the state legislatures and in what state legislative setting can we find them? Finally, I trace 
participation from sponsorship to roll call voting, and examine how both individual and 
institutional characteristics shape a legislator's choices regarding participation.  Reelection 
pressures, personal characteristics, political experience, and ambition all may make it more or 
less likely that an individual legislator participates a great deal or very little, and likewise may 
shape the types of activities in which a legislator chooses to participate.  Institutional 
characteristics such as legislative professionalization and partisan balance may also contribute to 
differences in participation across states.  Different chambers may also have different norms for 
participation. 
The second set of questions that this dissertation seeks to analyze involve the 
consequences of legislative participation, and it is here that the dissertation makes its most 
important and novel contribution.  While prior research has at times examined the decision to 
participate, virtually no recent scholarship has examined the political consequences of the choice 
to participate.  Does a willingness to participate entail costs?  Does a willingness to participate 
bring about long-term benefits, such as a "free ride" at the next election?  What types of 
participation are most politically beneficial to legislators?  Building on my earlier discussion of 
the causes of participation, and drawing on a rich theoretical literature focusing on legislative 
goals, I examine how participation has political consequences, once controlling for individual 
and institutional characteristics.  Is there any reward for being a workhorse or any consequence 




1.1 Theoretical Basis 
My research on the determinants and consequences of legislative participation draws on a 
rich literature on determinants of political participation across settings.  Since the seminal works 
of Downs (1957), Tullock (1967) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968), political scientists and 
economists alike have spent a significant amount of time to understand why people in the mass 
public choose to vote.  Downs (1957) notes that “if a theorist knows the ends of some decision-
maker, he can predict what actions will be taken to achieve them as follows: (1) he calculates the 
most reasonable way for the decision-maker to reach his goals, and (2) he assumes this way will 
actually be chosen because the decision-maker is rational” (4).  In other words, to understand and 
to predict participation, we need to understand first the goals that a political actor may be 
pursuing through such participation, and second the costs that participation involves.  While 
most of the empirical literature on participation that draws on this foundation has focused on 
mass-level participation, my dissertation focuses on elite-level participation.  Indeed, though 
Down's work is less often applied to legislative politics, the very nature of legislative politics 
may be much more suitable than mass publics for a rational choice framework.  The legislative 
arena is smaller than most voting bodies in the mass public, involves repeated interactions across 
legislators, and legislators enjoy much closer to perfect-information.   A focus on legislative 
politics can greatly contribute to our understanding of the decision to participate. 
Likewise, an examination of the decision to participate is of critical importance to 
understanding legislative politics.  According to Hall (1996), “if we are to understand fully the 
nature of the relationships between legislators and interest groups, between legislators and 
bureaucrats, between legislators and party leaders, and between legislators and the president, 
legislative participation must come squarely into focus (9).  Hall starts with the assumption that 
the participation patterns of involvement will prove important for understanding the nature and 
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quality of representation, the variable exercise of influence in the calculus of legislative consent, 
and the nature of relationships between actors in Congress and other major actors in the national 
policy-making process.   
Notwithstanding the value of understanding legislative participation, the attention paid to 
this question by scholars of legislative politics has varied across time.  Hall (1996) notes that 
“while scattered studies have described the variability of participation, theoretical work on the 
subject has extended little beyond general references to the norms of hard work, specialization, 
and apprenticeship that are thought to have structured participation in the previous era."  (Hall 
goes on to observe that legislative norms are considered less powerful in contemporary 
legislative politics than before, and yet little effort has been made to explain participation.  
Explaining participation has occupied a central place in scholarship on organizational behavior 
and mass political behavior, but not in scholarship on elite behavior.   The research on 
participation in elite political behavior has been restricted to studies of political ambition, 
focusing on the decision to run for office, and studies on committee participation. 
1.2 Dissertation Overview 
Similar to Hall (1996), this research seeks to better understand how we characterize and 
define legislative participation. As Hall (1996) notes, legislative participation refers to no single, 
definable act.  Rather, it includes a number of different activities. In this dissertation, I analyze 
legislative participation at the state level from two different points in the legislative process:  bill 
sponsorship and roll call voting.  I am able to evaluate and distinguish between the effects of 
legislator-specific factor, and state-specific factors, as well as analyze how the decision to 
participate may change based on the legislative activity under consideration.  This research seeks 
to further test the congressional theories of participation developed by Hall (1996), of 
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sponsorship (Garand and Burke 2005) and of roll call vote participation (Rothenberg and 
Sanders 2002).   
The outline of this dissertation is as follows: Chapter 2 will provide an overview of the 
theoretical contribution of this dissertation, the methodological approach, and a review of the 
research on legislative participation.  Chapter 3 will outline and describe the data and variables 
used to analyze legislative participation, as well a brief discussion of the quantitative models.  
Chapter 4 will analyze bill sponsorship as an indicator of legislative participation and create a 
model of determinants of sponsorship.  Chapter 5 will analyze roll call participation, specifically 
absenteeism, as an indicator of legislative participation.  Further, it will create a model of 
determinants and also explore the relationship between bill sponsorship and roll call 
absenteeism.  Chapter 6 analyzes the consequences of participatory behavior, specifically 
addressing the impact of participatory behavior on challenger emergence. Finally, Chapter 7 will 
offer conclusions and avenues for expanding this research.   
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 What is Legislative Participation? 
 
Hall (1996) notes that legislative participation is no single, definable act; rather it is a 
general category that includes a range of different activities that vary in their visibility and 
legislative significance.  What functions of a legislator’s job are considered legislative 
participation?  In general, legislative participation can be thought of as the legislator performing 
the duties outlined by the rules and norms of the office he or she holds.  Hall (1996) notes that 
participation can be categorized as either formal or informal. Formal participation refers to any 
decision-making activity that takes places in formal legislative settings--for example, speaking 
during committee hearings, sponsoring legislation, or participating on roll call votes.  Informal 
participation refers to the "behind the scenes: work, or any decision-making activity that happens 
once the legislator leaves the committee meeting room or the chamber floor.  Informal 
participation includes such activities as constituency service, vote trading, and coalition building.  
This concept of having two forms of legislative participation is consistent with Fenno’s 
description of the persistent duality of the legislative career; one career is centered upon capital 
centered legislative activities, whereas the other is centered on district centered activities.  This 
dissertation research will focus on formal participation.  
Few pieces of research have directly addressed the issue of determinants and 
consequences of participatory behavior.1  Previous research has focused on several components 
of participation, such as constituency service (Freeman and Richardson 1996), bill sponsorship 
                                                           
1
 A notable exception is Box-Steffensmeier and Grant (1999) who analyze the relationship between legislative 
effectiveness and PAC contributions.  They find that legislators who are successful at passing their sponsored 
legislation are more likely to receive PAC contributions.   However, even there, the focus is on legislative 




(Garand and Burke 2005; Schiller 1995), committee participation and behavior (Hall 1996; 
Hamm and Moncrief 1982), and roll call voting (Rothenberg and Sanders 2000).   
2.2 Conceptualizing and Measuring Legislative Participation  
Legislative participation is a difficult concept to measure.  It is a complex activity with 
ambiguous meaning, but is often comprised of simple and definable activities. One way of 
approaching the definition of legislative participation is to only consider activities that are highly 
salient or result in new public policy. In this case, a measure of issue or salience or legislative 
effectiveness would be appropriate.  However, Hall notes that “some of the observable 
legislative activities that members perform day to day, whether in committee or on the floor, 
have little effect on the shape of the legislative that ultimately gets approved” (25).  And, in 
some circumstances “members take action that they do not expect, perhaps do not even intend, to 
have any immediate legislative consequences” (25).  Should we consider this form of legislative 
activity – that is, activity which is not intended or expected to influence public policy in the short 
term – to be primarily symbolic, and therefore not substantive? Hall argues to the contrary; he 
notes that “participation by the citizens’ several agents and hence the expression of a wide range 
of alternative points of view is central to the practice of democratic consent. It will invariably 
happen during legislative deliberations that certain views and interests get expressed that will 
almost certainly fail. But that does not render them meaningless or merely symbolic” (26).  In 
Hall’s view, even actions that are not of much consequence to legislative outcomes should be 
considered as substantive legislative participation. This line of reasoning suggests that sponsored 
legislation that never gets made into law or votes that are cast on a bill that will surely fail are 
still politically meaningful; the symbolic political behaviors of the short run may translate into 
the substantive political outcomes of the long run.  For this reason, this dissertation research will 
consider all sponsored legislation and votes on all roll call bills.  
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How should legislative participation be measured?  In a perfect world, all components of 
legislative participation would be considered. However, given data constraints and the 
impossibility of quantifying some participatory behavior, this research will focus on two 
indicators of legislative participation: bill sponsorship and roll call participation.  These 
indicators were chosen because of their visibility, centrality to the legislative career, and well-
defined role in the legislative process.   
2.2.1 Bill Sponsorship 
Bill sponsorship is considered to be the core activity that reflects a legislator's role in 
agenda-setting, which is perhaps the most critical stage in the legislative process (Bachrach and 
Baratz 1963, Cobb and Elder 1983, Kingdon 1989).  Previous research points to bill sponsorship 
as one appropriate indicator of political participation.  Drafting and introducing legislation is one 
of the most fundamental components of the legislative process.  It is also an activity that requires 
a large amount of time and effort on the part of the legislators. Warwo (2000) notes that “the 
tasks and responsibilities of the primary sponsor typically involve entrepreneurial activities such 
as gathering and communicating information, coalition building, and sheepherding legislative 
through the House” (27).  Further, it is one of the most visible legislative functions to both the 
constituency and the legislative membership.  Introducing legislation is one way that legislators 
can go about achieving their policy-related goals, earning respect among their peers, and gaining 
reelection support. It is the sponsor who is counted on to be there to defend the bill in committee, 
protect it on the floor, and handle relationships with the executive branch (Schneier and Gross 
1993).   
However, sponsorship is not a perfect measure of legislative activity.  Although drafting 
legislation is a central part of the sponsorship process, the sponsor may not be the actual author 
of the legislation.  Bills are often drafted solely by interest groups or legislative staff, and 
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brought to a legislator to sponsor.  In these instances, the actual cost of sponsorship in terms of 
time spent is less than it would be if a legislator drafted the measure himself.  Furthermore, some 
bills are simply easier to write than others.  The number of bills sponsored does not distinguish 
between bills that took months to draft and bills that took only a few hours; that it, it is not a 
measure of the time spent in crafting (or arguing for the passage of) legislation.    Another 
potential problem is the introduction of “clean bills,” or bills that a committee chair introduces 
after they are amended; clean bills may inflate the levels of productively of committee chairs.  
However, it is likely that the degree to which legislators use legislative staff and interest groups 
to draft measures varies much more by state than by legislator.  Moreover, the degree to which it 
varies by legislator likely depends on such factors as legislative leadership and seniority, which 
can be included in an analysis of sponsorship.  That is, more senior members, or members in 
leadership positions, may be able to participate more through sponsorship activity if they can 
rely on legislative staff or interest groups to assist them in the drafting of legislation.  
Nonetheless, if they sponsor a relatively high number of measures, then they can be viewed as 
being relatively active. It is the sponsor who is counted on to be there to defend the bill in 
committee, protect it on the floor, and handle relationships with the executive branch (Schneier 
and Gross 1993).  Even if the sponsor doesn’t literally write the bill, "sponsorship" of the bill 
nonetheless requires some time and effort.   Moreover, the electoral and reputational costs and 
benefits of sponsorship occur regardless of the process by which the bill came into existence.   
Most important, sponsorship entails taking responsibility for introducing political issues onto the 
legislative agenda, and the sponsor is regarded as the individual with responsibility for the 





2.2.2 Roll Call Absenteeism 
Roll call absenteeism was chosen as an indicator for two major reasons, both related to its 
status as a clearly definable act that is recorded in the state legislative records.  The availability 
and comparability of the data is a practical advantage.  Moreover, the very visibility of the act 
(and, more important, of the failure to act) makes it a particularly important measure of 
participation.  At the mass level, constituents view frequent absences as legislators “not doing 
their jobs.” At the elite level, absenteeism can be an indication that the legislator is not 
supporting the party, not contributing the policy objectives of the chamber, or simply not 
fulfilling their legislative responsibilities. Roll call voting is often the final step in the legislative 
process in the chamber.  Roll call voting is a way in which legislators publicly stake out policy 
positions. 
However, the absenteeism variable, like the sponsorship variable, is not perfect.  In many 
states, legislators can formally abstain from voting, but the roll call records from which this 
measure was collected rarely differentiate absenteeism from abstention.   I argue that both 
casting an abstention vote and being absent measures the same concept in terms of the research 
question.  Both will be interpreted by others as a decision not to go on record—and often reflects 
a lack of commitment, regardless of the reason, on the part of a legislator.  In both instances 
(absenteeism and abstention) the legislator failed to pay the information cost of voting either 
“yea” or “nay.” Although additional research will be needed to further explore the differences 
and similarities between abstention and absenteeism, this current research project will not 
distinguish between the two ways in which a legislator can fail to cast a vote. 
The assumption that missing votes “occur randomly, such as when a legislator misses a 
plane or is too ill to be wheeled to the floor on a gurney” (Cohen and Noll 1991) ignores the 
possibility that a series of missed votes can often be explained systematically.  If absenteeism 
 11 
  
can be explained systematically, then the decision to vote will be linked with other aspects of 
legislative behavior. This research models the failure to cast a roll call vote as a systematic 
choice to "shirk". To fully understand participation, it is important to understand non-
participation.   
2.3 Why Study Legislative Participation? 
 
What are the rationales for studying legislative participation at the elite level?  Hall 
(1996) notes that legislative participation has traditionally received little attention among 
scholars.  Those works that have focused on participation have focused primarily on career paths.  
Prior work has focused on norms that might encourage or discourage participation (e.g., 
Matthews 1963), or examines the degree to which legislators become more active and more 
specialized across their careers (Hibbing 1991).  While scattered studies have described the 
variability of participation, theoretical work on the subject has extended little beyond general 
references to the norms that shape career paths.  Hall further observes that legislative norms are 
considered less powerful in contemporary legislative politics than before, and yet little effort has 
been made to explain how participation varies independent of the influence of norms.  More 
generally, he argues that understanding activity (or the lack thereof) in legislative politics is a 
key element of understanding decision-making in legislatures; in his view, too much focus has 
been placed on majoritarian politics, and too little on how, within a particular political context, 
participation can influence outcomes (8).  
Further, Hall (1996) notes that, “if we are to understand fully the nature of the 
relationships between legislators and interest groups, between legislators and bureaucrats, 
between legislators and party leaders, and between legislators and the president, legislative 
participation must come squarely into focus" (9).   Hall concludes that understanding 
participation is essential to understanding a wide array of other questions, such as the character 
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of representation, the ways in which legislators work collaboratively or in opposition, both 
individual and group decision-making, agenda setting, and policy outcomes  
A study of legislative participation is also particularly valuable because it focuses on the 
elite level rather than on the mass level.  There are several rationales for the study of 
participation at the elite level.  First, as noted by Hall (1996), the majority of the research in 
political science and economics has centered on participation at the mass level (see Downs 1957; 
Campbell, et. al. 1960; and Popkin 1991), but significantly less is known about the participation 
behavior at the elite level.  Moreover, the study of participation at the mass level has been 
focused attempts to resolve the seeming "paradox of participation"—that individuals participate 
even when such participation is seemingly irrational. 
Scholars such as Aldrich (1993) argue that mass level participation is an activity with few 
costs and few benefits and is therefore problematic to the rational choice model.  In contrast, elite 
level analysis of legislative bodies, which are characterized by smaller sizes, repeated 
interactions between legislators, and an almost perfect-information environment, can potentially 
provide a more hospitable environment for the rational choice approach. Studying participation 
at the elite level will provide insight not only to legislator behavior, but to participatory behavior 
in general.   
Second, members across and within legislative institutions enjoy varying amounts of 
legislative resources which they can invest, and vary as well in their individual political goals.  
For this reason as well, the degree to which legislators participate is highly variable.  Hall notes 
that “it reflects the intensity of their personal or political interest in the matter; the amount of 
resources that they have to commit; and, under certain specifiable conditions, the strategic 
calculations they will make regarding the expected return on their resource investments.  In sum, 
one needs to think not only  about what members want legislatively but also about their 
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willingness and ability to pay what it takes to get it” (7). This uneven distribution of legislative 
resources is particularly interesting at the state level, where resources vary not only across the 
individual, but across states and legislative institutions.  Thus, economic analysis of political 
actors requires two major steps: first, that we explore the political goals pursued by individuals 
(and the benefits of achieving those goals), and second, that we understand the costs of the 
different ways in which goals can be pursued.  Previous research by Fenno (1972) and Mayhew 
(1974) have already defined the goals of legislators.  According the Mayhew and Fenno, 
legislators are single-minded seekers of reelection.  Secondary to gaining reelection, according to 
Fenno, is achieving influence within the legislative body and making good public policy.  
However, reelection is the proximate goal, in that it is “the goal that must be achieved over and 
over if other ends are to be entertained” (Mayhew 1974, 16).  Thus, a legislator as “rational 
man,” is simply an actor that “moves toward his goals in a way which, to the best of his 
knowledge, uses the least possible input of scarce resources per unit of valued output” (Downs 
1957, 5).   
Why do some legislators participate with greater frequency than others?  In this research, 
I will argue that the decision to participate is determined by an individual calculus of cost and 
benefits, which are conditioned by a variety of individual, institutional, and state level factors. It 
must be noted that the primary purpose of this research is not to develop a formal rational choice 
model of legislative participation.  I will, however, assume that legislators carefully weigh out 
their costs and benefits before making their participatory decisions.  
 Hall (1996) sums it up quite nicely: “the House floor presents the individual member 
with a set of ways in which she might use her legislative time and resources to pursue her 
objectives, something like a set of political investment opportunities.  Which ones she chooses, 
which ones she forgoes, will depend on her estimates regarding their relevance to her various 
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interests and the likely political returns of each; the legislative resources she has to invest by 
comparison with other actors, and her expectations that her investment is likely to achieve the 
results she seeks; and the information and transaction costs that she will pay—calculations that 
may vary dramatically member to member” (184).   
2.4 Other Contributions to the Literature 
In addition to the contribution to the legislative participation literature, this research also 
seeks to add to the theoretical development of state politics.  Furthermore, it seeks to analyze the 
role of legislative professionalism in conditioning the participatory behavior of legislators.    
2.4.1 A Broader Vision of State Politics 
A major concern Jewell (1982) was that the study of state politics “is a barren one in 
terms of theoretical development.  While students of cross-national comparative politics develop 
elaborate and competing theories about political development, institutionalization, functionalism, 
and political culture, those whose comparative study is limited to the fifty American states seem 
to be working in a theoretical vacuum” (651).  Jewell suggests that state politics scholars turn 
their attention from single state analyses, to broader cross-state studies, while “being more 
sensitive to the theoretical dimensions of state studies” (655).  Over a decade later, Moncrief, 
Thompson, and Cassie (1996) note the progress of Jewell’s vision of the state politics research 
agenda in areas such as gender, campaigns and elections, and legislative organization.   
In the most recent review of the state politics literature, Clucas (2003) summarizes how 
far the study of state politics has come since the Lawrence Herson’s article “The Lost World of 
Municipal Government” (1957).  Clucas notes that since 1990, over 200 articles on state 
legislatures have been published in leading scholarly journals, exploring a wide range of 
substantive questions and drawing on a variety of theoretical perspectives (387). According to 
Clucas, the problem of state politics research today “is not simply a lack of theory, for most 
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studies published today are framed in some theoretical perspective.  Rather, the problem is the 
lack of a broader vision in trying to explain state legislative politics” (388).  Much of the state 
level research today is conducted in terms of discrete research questions, with little effort being 
made to place these questions into a broader question.  In other words, we are learning more and 
more about less and less.   
This dissertation seeks to place a particular research question (why do some state 
legislators participate more than others?) in a broad theoretical context.  Theories of mass or 
even elite level participation have yet to be fully tested and applied to state legislative politics.  
In terms of the broader vision of state politics, the hope is that further understanding the “why 
they participate” question will add to the already existing body of legislative decision making 
literature.  Further, this research fits into the current progression of the state legislative politics 
literature.  Where previous research has focused on the state as the unit of analysis, 
contemporary state politics research is relatively like to place the individual legislator at the 
center of analysis.   Studies of state level careerism and ambition provide a good example of this 
progression. Earlier work by Squire (1988) models career patterns by analyzing the opportunity 
structure (in terms of prospects for higher office, staff, and salary) that each state legislature 
offers their members.  Later work is more likely to focus on the factors that influence individual 
careers.  This dissertation contributes to the scholarship on individual-level legislative behavior 
and careers within state legislatures, so that we can draw conclusions about individual, district, 
institutional, and state level factors that might shape the decision to participate. 
This dissertation also seeks to take what we have learned from participation in Congress, 
and examine it in the state legislative setting.  While it is important for those who study state 
legislative politics to build and test theories unique to the subfield, we also benefit from testing 
congressional theories and findings at the state level.  This approach can help us understand how 
 16 
  
institutional settings can shape legislative behavior and outcomes.  Kiewiet, Loewenberg, and 
Squire (2002) note that although a large amount of research that has been devoted to the U.S. 
Congress, scholars have rarely investigated whether or how their conclusions can be applied to 
other legislative settings.  Congressional scholars over the years have developed important 
models of legislative behavior (see Mayhew 1957; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Fenno 1972; Hall 
1996; and Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987 for some examples) that could be tested at the state 
legislative level, thus providing new theoretical perspectives and refining established theories.  
Finally, Kiewiet, Lowenberg, and Squire (2002) note that “the most important reason for 
pursuing comparative legislative research is that so much of the recent literature of the U.S. 
Congress has been inconclusive” (4). And, “there is a strong sense among congressional scholars 
the theoretical insights that have driven research over the past few decades, derived primarily 
from various manifestations of the rational choice approach, have raised many issues but 
resolved few of them” (4).  Originally scholars may have developed formal theories of legislative 
organizations with the goal to better understand Congress, but now scholars need to test these 
theories in other legislative settings.  State politics scholars have noted the importance of using 
congressional theories at the state level.  In addition to general theoretical development, Jewell 
(1981) argues that state politics should “bridge the gap that still exists between congressional and 
state legislative research” (1).  Clucas suggests that “the research on congressional politics 
provides a valuable model for scholars of state legislatures, with its strong theoretical orientation 
that has helped is build a large body of literature and gain great insight into legislative politics” 
(407).   Bridging Congressional research and state legislative research can help political 
scientists build knowledge in both areas. 
Brace and Jewett (1995) recommend an “inclusive approach” to the study of American 
politics, where “such things as presidential and congressional elections, voting behavior or 
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federal expenditure patterns that might normally be considered outside state politics are included 
in cases where the states played an intrinsic role, either as an explanatory factor, or as a domain 
for political interactions” (646).  note that “there are abundant opportunities for fruitful cross-
pollination with other subfields in American politics which ultimately can provide more 
complete and clearer understandings of state and national politics, and politics in general” (645).   
This study uses an inclusive approach in its theoretical development.  Concepts and 
models of participation were directly borrowed from the congressional literature.  The purpose 
here is twofold: the primary goal of this research is to develop and test a theory of state level 
participation and the secondary goal is to examine and test preexisting congressional theories of 
participation.  Further, as suggested by Kiewiet, Lowenberg, and Squire (2002), this research 
seeks to develop a generalizable theory of legislative participation that can be utilized in a 
comparative setting.   
One of the primary advantages of choosing the American states as the context in which to 
study politics is that the literature on state politics combines two major fields within political 
science: American and comparative politics.  The context of this dissertation is the American 
states, but the comparative method is used as an analytical tool.  Like developing democracies, 
the US states have experienced considerable institutional growth over the past 40 years, from the 
reapportionment revolution in the 1960s, to the legislative reform movement in the 1970s, to 
Reagan’s devolution in the 80s, to the term limits movement in the 1990s.  Clucas (2003) 
identifies the study of institutions as being particularly theoretically well developed, noting that 
“scholars have shown more consistent attention to theory building here than in any other area of 
state legislative research, and, as a result, this line of study offers great promise for future 
research" (402).  Indeed, the marked diversity across state legislatures positions state legislative 
politics as the center of research on legislative institutions.  Shifting the focus away from 
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Congress and toward state legislatures gives us an opportunity to examine how institutional 
factors and context can influence legislative behavior and outcomes (Brace and Jewett 1995). 
2.4.2 Legislative Professionalism 
Previous studies of legislative professionalism have focused on a variety of different 
questions, ranging from the factors that shape the demand for interest groups (Berkman 2001; 
Gray and Lowery 1996), the causes and consequences of divided government (Fiorina 1994; 
Squire 1997); the rise of careerism (Squire 1988; Maestas 2003); membership stability (Squire 
1988; Moncrief, Thompson, and Kurtz 1996); and gubernatorial influence and effectiveness 
(Dilger, Krause, and Moffett 1995). According to Squire (2007) “measures of professionalism 
are intended to assess the capacity of both individual members and the organization as a whole to 
generate and digest information in the policy process” (211).   Professionalism has been 
hypothesized to influence a wide range of behaviors and outcomes, both within and outside the 
legislature.  Given the concept’s importance across a wide spectrum of state politics research, the 
influence of professionalism on legislative participation is a crucial part of any discussion of 
legislative participation. 
The concept of professionalism–and measures of the concept of professionalism–has a 
rich history in empirical scholarship.  Measures of legislative professionalism first surfaced in 
the early 1970’s in work done by Grunn (1971) and the Citizens Conference of State Legislatures 
in (1971).  The most widely used measure of professionalism was first developed by Squire 
(1992a).  Squire’s index was developed from work initially done by Polsby, who noted that “one 
favored place to begin has been for reformers quite consciously to adopt as their model the 
United States Congress. In American state legislatures this has meant a movement toward the 
establishment of a respectable pay scale, provision for independent staff services, and increases 
in the time allowed for legislatures to sit (Polsby 1975, 297).   Specifically, Squire’s index is a 
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comparison of the state to Congress, using an index of pay, average days in session, and average 
staff per member (Squire 2007, 212).  That is, Squire’s index measures how closely the 
legislature was to that of Congress.  This index is widely considered in the state politics literature 
to be the standard measure for legislative professionalism, and will therefore be used in this 
dissertation research. 
The major critique of Squire’s index comes from Rosenthal (1996), who argues that 
“professionalism as a concept ought to be restricted to the legislature and not extended to include 
the members who compromise it” (175).  Further, Rosenthal argues that “institutional 
professionalism refers to the improvement of legislative facilities, the increase in information 
availability to the legislature, the size and variety of legislative staffs, and probably the time 
spent at legislative work” (175).  In particular, Rosenthal objects to the inclusion of individual 
legislator salary as part of an index for legislative professionalism, noting that salary is a 
dimension of careerism rather than professionalism.  In other words, changes in salary have an 
effect on behavior at the individual level, whereas changes in staff and session length have 
institutional level effects.  In general, it is possible that one or two of the elements of 
"professionalism" are what are of theoretical interest, rather than the entire scale.  In this 
research, the unit of analysis is the individual legislator and a major independent variable is 
Squire’s index.  However, this research investigates both state and institutional effects on 
participation, and all the elements of Squire's index likely influence both individual level activity 
and aggregate participation in the legislature.  Table 1 outlines the major theoretical implications 
of the components of Squire’s professionalism index. According to Squire (1988a) higher 
salaries allow legislators to devote more time and energy to lawmaking by freeing them from the 
distraction of another occupation.  This research hypothesizes that higher salaries may provide 
legislators with more freedom to participate in legislative activities.   
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Implications for Legislator  Implications for Legislature 
Salary and Benefits 
• Increased incentive to 
serve, leading to 
longer tenure 
 
• Increased ability to 
focus on legislative 
activities 
• Leads to members with 
longer tenure, creating a 
more experienced body 
 
• Attracts better qualified 
members 
Time demands of 
service 
• Reduced opportunities 
to pursue other 
employment and 
increased need for 
higher salary to 
compensate for lost 
income 
 
• Increased opportunity 
to master legislative 
skills 
• Increased time for policy 
development 
 
• Increased time for policy 
deliberation  
Staff and resources 




• Increased policymaking 
influence relative to the 
executive 
• Increased job 
satisfaction  
 
• Enhanced re-election 
prospects 
 
SOURCE: Squire (2007), “Measuring Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited” 
 
That is, higher salaries in the chamber would increase the ability of individual legislators 
to focus on participation; participation is less costly, because it is less likely to detract from the 
pursuit of goals related to another career.  In terms of the legislature as an institution, a chamber 
that attracts more experienced and better qualified members, and that devoted more time to 
lawmaking activities, is one that is likely to encourage participation.  
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The most straight forward effect of participation comes from the increase in session 
length.  As time in session increases, members have more time to participate in legislative 
activities.  Full-time legislators likely have more incentive to participate in part because they are 
expected to do so by their constituency – and they can participate with fewer costs, because they 
do not have the distraction and demands of competing career.  As time increases, legislatures 
will be able to more effectively produce and deliberate over policy outputs, thus increasing 
aggregate participation.  Moreover, previous research has shown that increases in staff increases 
legislator job satisfaction and re-election prospects.  It is likely that legislators who enjoy their 
job (while feeling secure in their position) are more likely to be active in bringing legislative 
proposals to the policy agenda. 
An emerging and important area in this body of literature is the connection between 
professionalism, public opinion, and job performance.  The literature finds that legislative 
professionalism influences job performance ratings (see Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992; 
Jewell 1982; and Cotter 1986).  Although these studies have found that economic and social 
conditions influence the public’s assessment of the state legislatures, the causal mechanism that 
connects legislative professionalism with negative responses by citizens is still generally unclear.   
A study using an extensive dataset drawn from 124 polls, across 13 states, over a period of 26 
years, finds that state polls show that job performance ratings declined as state legislatures 
become more professional, and that citizens from states with more professionalized legislatures 
were more supportive of term limit legislation (Hamman 2006).  The longitudinal analysis shows 
that legislative job performance ratings decline in the 1980s and early 1990s after levels of 
legislative professionalism reached their highest levels.  However, the relationship between 
public approval of legislatures and professionalism appears to depend on the level of 
professionalism of the states in question.  In states that are relatively less professionalized or 
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moderately professionalized, approval appears to rise with professionalism.  When state 
legislatures become highly professionalized, however, public approval of legislatures begins to 
decline.  Further, Hamman (2006) finds that the volume of bills passed by the legislature has a 
negative effect on citizen performance ratings.  These findings are contradictory to the intent of 
reformers, who believed that full time professional legislatures assisted by more competent staff 
would enact policies more consistent with the preferences of their constituents (consistent with 
the expectation that when constituency preferences are met, approval ratings will increase).  
Maestas (2000) finds that the policy outputs of professional legislatures are more ideologically 
representative of citizens that the policy outputs of less professionalized legislatures.   
It is overwhelming evident that the public is not very knowledgeable about legislative 
politics, making the relationship between professionalism and public approval (and policy 
outputs) somewhat difficult to interpret.   Hibbing and Theiss-Moore (1995) find that at the 
Congressional level, the public is particularly uncomfortable with deliberative, conflictual, or 
democratic processes.  However, these are the very processes that often allow legislators to build 
policy consensus in the chamber, and promote cooperation between the legislative and executive 
branches of government. 
2.4.3 The Role of Informational Costs and Institutional Knowledge 
From previous research, scholars have learned legislative behavior fluctuates over the 
legislative career (see Hibbing 1990).  This fluctuation is caused in part by the incumbency 
advantage, which may reduce the opportunity costs of a relatively high degree activity within the 
legislature compared to activity in constituency service and outreach.  The fluctuation may also 
be related in part to the institutional knowledge a legislator gains from service in the legislature.  
Indeed, the degree to which changes in behavior across the legislative career can be attributed to 
increased electoral safety and increased institutional knowledge is likely enhanced by the 
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relatively uniqueness of a legislative career.  Holding legislative office requires no formal job 
training or qualifications.  Legislators, especially at the state level, come from a variety of 
different previous occupations and educational backgrounds.  Job activities such as drafting bills, 
forging relationships with interest groups, voting on measures in committee and on the chamber 
floor, making speeches, deliberating in committee, and building coalitions are all highly specific 
to the institution in which they are conducted.  For new legislators, the informational and 
opportunity costs of performing theses activities are relatively high. For example, new legislators 
may have no prior bill drafting experience or may lack the political connections to know which 
interest groups can be of greatest assistance.  Furthermore, many legislators get elected by 
addressing very issues that are highly specific to their district; once in office, however, 
legislators are required to take positions on a variety of policies.  The process by which 
legislators gain information to make decisions about how to participate entails substantial 
informational costs—costs which decrease as they gain experience.  Junior legislators generally 
must take time to learn policy making rules and norms, from the correct way to draft a bill, the 
way in which bills are presented and deliberated in committee, the most effective path to forging 
relationships with other legislators to gain support for one's policy proposals, and the most 
effective way to oppose policy initiatives contrary to one's goals.  As the legislative career 
progresses, legislators may become more electorally safe—and may be able to devote less time 
in activities outside the legislature designed to shore up support.  Activity within the legislature 
may therefore entail fewer opportunity costs. 
This research includes several variables that are indicators of informational and 
opportunity costs.  I argue that different career stages carry different levels of informational 
costs.  For example, as tenure in office increases, a legislator should gain institutional 
knowledge, and the informational costs associated with performing legislative duties will likely 
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decrease.  Furthermore, previous elected experience may also ease informational costs, 
particularly at the beginning of the legislative career.  Legislators who have made a career of 
public service may be able to overcome informational costs much more efficiently than 
legislators without such experience.  The opportunity costs of activity within the chamber may 
be relatively low for legislators who are relatively electorally safe.  The roles of institutional 
knowledge and informational costs on specific variables will be further discussed in Chapters 4 
and 5.   
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CHAPTER 3: DATA 
 
This chapter provides a description of the data, measurements and descriptive statistics for all 
variables used in the proceeding empirical chapters.    
3.1 Description of Data 
 
The data used in this dissertation is a cross-sectional sample of legislators in ten 
American states during the 2001 legislative session. These states include Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, New Mexico, and Texas. States 
were selected for both data availability and necessary variation across key institutional variables 
(professionalism, state ideology, and term limits).  Please refer to Table 2 for term limit and 
professionalism categories by state.   
Table 2: Term Limit, Professionalism, and Ideology Categories by State 




State Mass Ideology2  
AR Yes Citizen 49.72 (7) 
CA Yes Professional 56.67 (4) 
CO Yes Hybrid 39.81 (10) 
FL Yes Hybrid 49.85 (6) 
IL No Professional 58.65 (2) 
MD No Hybrid 67.65 (1) 
MI Yes Professional 58.12 (3) 
NC No  Hybrid 47.02 (8) 
NM No Citizen 54.11 (5) 
TX No Hybrid 42.65 (9) 
 
Previous research has indicated that national shifts in partisan support influence 
legislative behavior, thus the 2001 legislative session was chosen because of its occurrence as 
both an off-election year (in the states and at the national level) and a non-presidential election 
year (Rivers and Rose 1995; Page and Sapiro 1993; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993).  The 
states were also selected to represent the US states as a whole.  Please refer to Table 3 for a 
                                                           
2 Liberalism ranking is located in parentheses.   
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comparison of the sampled states verses the total state population.  The ten states chosen for 
analysis have relatively high populations.  However, the ideology of their populations is roughly 
comparable to the average citizen ideology in all fifty states, and the average household income 
in the ten state sample is very close to that of all fifty states.  The ten states are also marginally 
more racially diverse and urban than are all fifty states.  The state legislatures tend to be more 
professionalized, largely because of the inclusion of California and Michigan in the sample. The 
sampled states are marginally more racially diverse than the national average; they are very 
representative in terms of gender diversity, partisan balance, and majority party dominance.  It 
should be noted that the sample states are on average well within one standard deviation of the 
national average on each of the measures presented in Table 3.3 
The unit of analysis in this dissertation is the individual legislator. All legislators who 
were elected during regular elections and who served during the entire duration of the legislative 
session were included.  Furthermore, only members who represented single member districts 
were included in the data set (i.e. no legislators representing multi-member districts were 
included). Multi-member districts were excluded from all analyses because the very nature of 
multi-member districts distorts the electoral connection, making it difficult to draw any 
conclusions on the trade offs made by legislators.  In multi-member districts, where voters can 
support multiple candidates, it is difficult to assess the relationship between legislative activity 
and electoral accountability; this is particularly a problem for the analyses of electoral 
competition that I present in Chapter 6.  Furthermore, I include previous electoral margin in the 
analyses of participation; as noted in Chapter 2, relatively safe legislators may incur fewer 
opportunity costs when focusing on activity within the chamber.  The inclusion of multi-member 
districts would make it difficult to test the effect of previous electoral margin on participatory 
                                                           
3 The measure of citizen ideology used was developed by Berry, et. al. (1998); it ranges from 0 to 100, from very 
conservative to very liberal. (put the rest of the sources here) 
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behavior.  Therefore, the forty legislators that were elected from multi-member districts were 
removed from the sample. 






State Level Variable 
State Population (in millions) 11.52 5.62 
Citizen Ideology 43.72 46.44 
Percentage of African Americans 
in Population 
13.1 9.64 
Household Income (in thousands) 37.47 36.18 
Percentage Living in Urban Areas 30.7 26.7 
Institutional Level 
Legislative Professionalism Index 
(Squire 2000) 
0.25 0.18 
Percentage of Female Legislators 
in the Lower House (2001) 
26.67 24.23 
 
Percentage of Black Legislators in 
the Lower House4 
11.06 7.49 
Percentage of Democratic 




Average Percentage of Seats Held 





3.2 Measurement of Variables 
 
Table 4 provides the names and measurements for all dependent and independent 
variables used in this research.  The theoretical reasoning and expected impact of these variables 
will be discussed in the chapters four through six.  In this research, I conduct three analyses of 





                                                           
4
 Data Source: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies 
5 Data Source: http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/SPPQ/journal_datasets/klarner.shtml 
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Table 4: Measurement of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable Name Measurement  
Dependent Variables 
Bill Sponsorship The total number of bills the legislator sponsored during the 
2001 legislative session. Resolutions, which tend to be less 
substantive (and are often honorary), are not included.  
Roll Call Absenteeism The percentage of bills on which an individual legislator did 
not cast a "yea" or "nay" vote during the 2001 legislative 
session.  
Challenger Emergence Dichotomous Variable; coded 1 if the legislator faced a 




Political Party Dichotomous Variable; coded 1 if the legislator is a 
Republican and 0 otherwise 
Majority Party Dichotomous Variable; coded 1 if the legislator is a member of 
the majority party and 0 otherwise 
Previous Electoral Margin Measured as the percentage of the general election vote the 
legislator earned in the previous election.   
Seniority  A count of the total number of consecutive years the legislator 
served in his/her current seat. 
Freshman Dichotomous Variable; coded 1 if the legislator is currently 
serving in his/her first term, and 0 otherwise.  
Retirement Dichotomous Variable; coded 1 if the legislator is not running 
for reelection in the next election and 0 otherwise 
Gender Dichotomous Variable, coded 1 if the legislator is female and 
0 otherwise 
Party Leader Dichotomous Variable; coded 1 if the legislator is a member of 
the party leadership (speaker or floor/party leader) 
Committee Chair Dichotomous variable; coded 1 if the legislator is a committee 
chair and 0 otherwise6. 
Previous Elective 
Experience 
Dichotomous Variable; coded 1 if the legislator held previous 
elected office and 0 otherwise.  
Ideology W-Nominate score, ranging from -1 (very conservative) to 1 
(very liberal) 
Ideological Extremism Folded W-Nominate score, values ranging from 0 (ideological 
moderate) to 1 (ideologically extreme). 
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 (Table 4 Continued) 
  
Distance The average distance from the legislator’s district to the state 
capital. 
 
State and District Variables 
Citizen Ideology  The Berry, et. al. (1998) score for citizen ideology, ranging 
from 0 (very conservative) to 100 (very liberal). 
Social Diversity Sullivan's Index; ranges from 0 to 1 with high values 
indicating that citizens in the district share few common 
characteristics.  The index includes measures of income, 
occupation, education, age, and race.  
Institutional Variables 
Legislative Professionalism Measured as the rank (from 1 to 50) the state received on 
Squire's Index.  Low values indicate high professionalism. 
Term Limits Dichotomous Variable; coded 1 if the state is term limited and 
0 otherwise.  
 
Bill sponsorship and roll call vote participation will be used as indicators of participation 
and challenger emergence will be used as an indicator of the consequence of legislative 
participation.  As noted above, bill sponsorship is measured as the total number of bills 
sponsored by each legislator during the 2001 regular legislative session.  This number excludes 
any bills sponsored during special sessions and does not include the sponsorship of resolutions.  
Furthermore, legislative records generally made a distinction between cosponsorship and 
primary sponsorship; when such a distinction was made, only bills for which the legislator was 
the primary sponsor were included in the count. Table 5 includes the average number of bills 
sponsored by state.  Across all states, the average legislator sponsors about fifteen bills.  A 
relatively high number of measures are sponsored, on average, in Texas, California, and Illinois; 
a relatively low number of measures are sponsored, on average, in Colorado, Florida, and 
Maryland.  There is a great deal of variation in sponsorship levels across the states. Roll call vote 
participation is measured as the percentage of bills in which the member did not cast a “yea” or 
“nay” vote on during the 2001 regular legislative session.  Legislative records do not always 
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make a distinction between absenteeism (not being present to vote when the roll call occurs) and 
abstention (or a failure to vote "yea" or "nay", even when present in the chamber). I argue that 
the differences between these concepts are not relevant for this research, Both abstention and 
absenteeism are instances where the legislator did not take a formal position on the bill, thus 
shirking (voluntarily or not) on a central duty of their job. In both cases, the legislator did not 
stake out a visible policy stance on the bill.  Furthermore, the levels of roll call participation did 
not vary substantially across states, providing evidence that the variable was measuring the same 
concept in each legislature. Table 6 includes the average percentage of abstention per state.  
Legislators from New Mexico and Arkansas have the highest levels of roll call absenteeism, 
while Colorado has the lowest levels of absenteeism.  Across all states, the average legislator 
misses between seven and eight percent of roll call votes.   




State Mean N Std. Dev. 
AR 11.65 99 8.33 
CA 21.60 78 5.69 
CO 6.31 64 2.07 
FL 8.37 118 5.72 
IL 20.77 109 15.01 
MD 8.95 20 4.51 
MI 14.32 106 7.89 
NC 14.20 80 11.14 
NM 13.96 69 10.78 
TX 24.96 148 16.06 
Total 15.70 891 12.25 
 
Roll call vote participation is measured as the percentage of bills in which the member 
did not cast a “yea” or “nay” vote on during the 2001 regular legislative session.  Legislative 
records do not always make a distinction between absenteeism (not being present to vote when 
                                                           
7 In Illinois, the Democratic Speaker and Republican floor leader (Michael Madigan and Lee Daniels) were the 
primary sponsors of an extremely high number of bills.  To eliminate the possibility that these two legislators would 
distort the results of the analyses, they were eliminated from the study. 
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the roll call occurs) and abstention (or a failure to vote "yea" or "nay", even when present in the 
chamber). I argue that the differences between these concepts are not relevant for this research, 
both abstention and absenteeism are instances where the legislator did not take a formal position 
on the bill, thus shirking (voluntarily or not) on a central duty of their job. In both cases, the 
legislator did not stake out a visible policy stance on the bill.  Furthermore, the levels of roll call 
participation did not vary substantially across states, providing evidence that the variable was 
measuring the same concept in each legislature. Table 6 includes the average percentage of 
abstention per state.  Legislators from New Mexico and Arkansas have the highest levels of roll 
call absenteeism, while Colorado has the lowest levels of absenteeism.  Across all states, the 
average legislator misses between seven and eight percent of roll call votes.8   
Table 6: Average Percentage of  
Absenteeism by State  
State Average N Std. Dev. 
AR 12.1 99 7.1 
CA 7.9 78 5.7 
CO 2.9 64 4.2 
FL 4.2 118 3.6 
IL 4.9 109 8.8 
MD 5.2 20 3.6 
MI 6.1 106 7.4 
NC 9.2 80 12.1 
NM 15.4 69 12.9 
TX 7.5 148 7.5 
Total 7.5 891 8.6 
 
What is the relationship between sponsorship and absenteeism?  Do legislators with high 
levels of absenteeism also have high levels or sponsorship? To test the relationship between 
sponsorship and absenteeism Table 7 provides the results from a Pearson’s correlation between 
sponsorship and absenteeism.  The results indicate that the two variables are positively 
                                                           
8 Legislators who missed more than 95% of all roll calls were eliminated from the analysis. 
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correlated, indicating that as levels of sponsorship rise as do levels of absenteeism.  In other 
words, high levels of sponsorship activity are significantly associated with high levels of 
participation on roll call votes.  This relationship will be further explored in Chapter 5.  
Table 7: Pearson Correlation between Sponsorship  
and Absenteeism 
  Sponsorship Absenteeism 
Sponsorship     
Pearson Correlation 1 0.244** 
Sig. (2-tailed) N/A 0.000 
N 945 945 
Absenteeism     
Pearson Correlation 0.244** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 . 
N 945 945 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
To further clarify the relationship between sponsorship and absenteeism, Figure 1 
provides a summary of the absenteeism (in percent) and sponsorship by state. Although the 
overall relationship between absenteeism and sponsorship is positive, it is clear that in some 
states (Texas, California, and Illinois) high levels of sponsorship are associated with low levels 
of absenteeism.  Again, this relationship will be further explored in the forthcoming chapters.   
This research will consider the impact of two institutional variables; legislative professionalism 
and term limits.  Because of their centrality to this research, it is important to understand their 
relationship with the two indicators of participation.  Figure 2 provides a line graph of the 
relationships between sponsorship and legislative professionalism and between absenteeism and 
legislative participation.  With the exception of Texas, it seems that the general relationship 
between sponsorship and professionalism is a negative one; as professionalism rises, levels of 
sponsorship seem to fall.  However, as clarified by the line graph, the negative relationship is a 
very general trend.  What is most apparent is a distinct state by state variation across sponsorship 
levels. In terms of absenteeism, the relationship between absenteeism and professionalism is 
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fairly constant until Colorado.  From Figure 2, it seems that once professionalism decreases to a 
certain level, roll call absenteeism begins to rise. 
 
Figure 1: Average Sponsorship and Absenteeism by States 
 
 
Figure 2: Sponsorship and Absenteeism by Levels of Professionalism 
 
Figure 3 provides a comparison of absenteeism and sponsorship levels across term 
limited and non-term limited states.  In terms of sponsorship, legislators from term limited states 
sponsor less legislation; however the difference is only about four bills.  Legislators from non-
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term limited states show up to vote on roll call bills about two percent less than legislators from 
term limited states.   
 
Figure 3: Sponsorship and Absenteeism by Term Limits 
 
The challenger emergence variable measures whether or not the incumbent was 
challenged by a major party candidate in the next general election.  Of the 891 legislators serving 
during the 2001 legislative term, only 657 ran for reelection. Furthermore, of those 657, only half 
faced a challenge in the next election.  Table 8 includes the frequency of the total challenges and 
contested elections. Arkansas, Florida, and New Mexico had the lowest rates of challenger 
emergence of all the states.  In fact, only 20% of incumbents running for reelection were 
challenged in Arkansas.  This is a stark difference to the electoral environment in Michigan, 
where only one incumbent running for reelection did not face a challenge.  Incumbents 
California faced a similar electoral environment, with nearly 85% drawing a challenge.  Figure 4 
illustrates the rates of challenger emergence across legislative professionalism.  The general 
trend indicates that as professionalism decreases, so do challenges to incumbents. Maryland 
appears to be an outlier in data; this may be partially caused by the exclusions of the multi-
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member districts.  The relationship between challenger emergence and professionalism will be 
further explored in Chapter 6.   
Table 8: Frequency of Unchallenged and Challenged  
Elections by State 
 Unchallenged Challenged Total  
Percent 
Challenged 
AR 52 13 65 20.0% 
CA 7 39 46 84.8% 
CO 15 34 49 69.4% 
FL 65 27 92 29.3% 
IL 41 48 89 53.9% 
MD 4 12 16 75.0% 
MI 1 54 55 98.2% 
NC 34 30 64 46.9% 
NM 38 21 59 35.6% 
TX 72 50 122 41.0% 
Total  329 328 657 49.9% 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the difference in challenger emergence across term limited and non-
term limited states.  Incumbents are about 10% more liklely to draw a challenge in term limted 
states, than they are in non-term limited states.  The relationship between term limits and 
challenger emergence will be futher analyzed in Chapter 6. The results from Figure 5 seem to 
indicate that term limits do not act as a major deterrant or attractor for potential challengers.  
Referring back to Table 3, this research uses a number of individual, institutional, and 
state/district level independent variables.  A few of these variables need more explanation than 
what is provided in Table 3. Previous elective experience includes any experience in elected 
public office, such as city council or school board, or previous legislative experience. The 
distance variable was calculated an average of the furthest point in the district to the state capital 









Figure 5: Percentage of Legislators Challenged by Term Limits 
 
Referring back to Table 3, this research uses a number of individual, institutional, and 
state/district level independent variables.  A few of these variables need more explanation than 
what is provided in Table 3. Previous elective experience includes any experience in elected 
public office, such as city council or school board, or previous legislative experience. The 
distance variable was calculated an average of the furthest point in the district to the state capital 
and the closest point in the district to the state capital (in miles).   
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Ideology is measured by a W-nominate score, ranging from -1 (very liberal) to 1 (very 
conservative).  The W-nominate score is a scaling method developed by Poole and Rosenthal 
(1997).  Using the matrix of binary choices by legislators (in this case, “yea” or “nay” on state 
roll call votes) over a series of state roll call votes, W-Nominate produces a configuration of 
legislators and outcome points for the Yea and Nay alternatives for each roll call using a 
probabilistic model of choice.9 A legislator’s vote choice on these roll calls can then be 
transformed into the -1 to 1 scale.  The ideological extremism variable is simply the absolute 
value of the W-Nominate score.  This dissertation research uses a variable developed by Berry, 
et. al. (1998) to measure citizen ideology at the state level.  This measure assigns an ideological 
position to each member of Congress (using interest group ratings), then estimates citizen 
ideology in each Congressional district of a state using the ideology score for the district’s 
incumbent, the estimated score for a challenger (or hypothetical challenger) to the incumbent, 
and election results (under the assumption that these results reflect the ideological divisions in 
the electorate).  Citizen ideology scores for each district are used to compute an unweighted 
average for the state as a whole.10 Finally, social diversity is measured by the Sullivan Index, 
which ranges from 0 to 1 with high values indicating that citizens in the district share few 
common characteristics. The Sullivan Index is composed of five district level demographic 
characteristics: family income (percent $100K or greater, percent less than $100K but greater 
than $50K, percent $50K or less); occupation (percent in manufacturing, percent in service 
industry, percent in government, percent in farming); education (percent with at least a two-year 
degree, percent with less than a two- year degree); age (percent aged 55 years old and older, 
                                                           
9
 For a detailed discussion of the W-Nominate process, please refer to Poole and Rosenthal (1997).   
10
 For a detailed discussion of the citizen ideology variable, please refer to Berry, et. al. (1998). 
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percent younger than 55); and race/ethnicity (percent White, percent Black, percent Hispanic, 
percent Asian).11 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 9 provides descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent variables.  
Across all states, legislators sponsor on average about sixteen bills.  The legislator responsible 
for the upper bound of sponsorship (101 bills during the 2001 legislative session) was Wyvette 
Hoover Young (D) from Illinois. Representative Young is seventy-one years old and as served in 
the Illinois state legislature for the past twenty seven years.   The average legislator was absent 
on 7.5 percent of roll call bills, with legislators from New Mexico averaging the highest 
percentage of absenteeism and  legislators from Colorado averaging the lowest percentage of 
absenteeism.  In terms of challenger emergence, half the states had more contested seats than 
uncontested seats.   
Of the 891 legislators, about 47% were Democrats and 58% were in the majority party in 
their chamber. Legislators across states had an average of 5.5 years in office. The longest tenure 
in office was thirty-five years (Tom Uher, D, Texas); just over two hundred legislators were in 
their first term.  Nearly twenty-five percent of legislators were retiring in the next legislative 
term. In terms of position within the chamber, about one quarter of legislators served as 
committee chairs.   
                                                           
11 Sullivan (1973) uses the following formula to compute social diversity scores:  
      p 
AW = 1 - ( å Yk
2 / V) 
                      k=1 
Where: 
AW = the social diversity measure for the district. 
Yk
2 = the proportion of the district within a given category for each variable. 
V    = the number of variables. 
p    = the total number of categories within each of the variables. 
Data on district characteristics comes from Barone, Lilley, and DeFranco (1997) and Lilley, DeFranco, and 







Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable Name Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
Bill Sponsorship 891 15.69 12.25 1 101 
Roll Call 
Absenteeism 
891 7.50 8.62 0 9.21 
Challenger 
Emergence 
657 49.92 50.03 0 1 
Independent Variables 
Individual Factors 
Republican 891 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Majority Party 891 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Electoral Margin 889 0.78 0.19 0.501 1 
Seniority 891 5.51 5.30 1 35 
First Year 891 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Retirement 891 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Female 891 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Leader 891 0.02 0.15 0 1 




891 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Ideology 891 -0.045 0.70 -1 1 
Ideological 
Extremism 
891 0.66 0.23 0.017 1 
Distance 891 1.47 1.11 0 5.35 
State/District Level Factors 
Social Diversity  886 0.361 0.043 0.21 0.48 





(Table 9 continued) 
 
Institutional Factors 
Professionalism 891 16.3 12.42 1 41 
Term Limited 891 0.52 0.5 0 1 
 
Of course, very few (2.2%) legislators held a top leadership position.  Almost half of the 
state legislators in this study (nearly 45%) had held previous office.  In terms of ideology, the 
average member was ideologically moderate (leaning slightly liberal).  About 75% of legislators 
were male.  
The average legislator’s district was located about 147 miles from the state capital. On 
average, legislators from Florida and California had to travel the furthest to their respective state 
capitals and legislators from Colorado had the least distance to travel.  The legislative who had to 
travel the farthest distance from his district to his capital (Joseph Pickett) served in Texas.  
Please refer to Table 10 for a summary of the average distances by state.   
Table 10: Average Distances to State Capital by State 
State Average Distance N Std. Dev.  
AR 79.71 99 45.86 
CA 260.99 78 144.82 
CO 51.76 64 59.04 
FL 273.01 118 106.40 
IL 146.84 109 44.76 
MD 63.25 20 39.19 
MI 74.81 106 50.83 
NC 96.06 80 52.07 
NM 119.63 69 86.83 
TX 176.31 148 99.63 
Total 147.04 891 111.49 
 
As noted above, the ten states used in this study were roughly representative of the nation 
as a whole in terms of citizen ideology.  There was substantial range in citizen ideology across 
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the states, however.  Colorado had the most conservative citizenry, while Maryland had the most 
liberal population.  Please refer to Table 2 for a summary of citizen ideology by state.  On 
average, the states represented in this research were ideologically moderate.   
In sum, the states selected vary across key institutional variables and are representative of 
the US states as a total population.  Furthermore, there is substantial state by state variation in the 









CHAPTER 4: PARTICIPATION AND BILL SPONSORSHIP 
 
4.1 Previous Research on Bill Sponsorship 
 
In keeping with the major goal of this research project, this chapter seeks to answer the 
question “why are some members so active, while some members are so inactive?” Or, in terms 
of sponsorship, why do some members actively sponsor legislation, while others do not?  Many 
previous studies at the congressional level have examined the effects of various factors on the 
sponsorship and co-sponsorship activities of individual members (Garand and Burke 2005, 
Campbell 1982, Frantzich 1979, Schiller 1995).  Schiller (1995) describes three possible costs of 
bill sponsorship: resource costs, opportunity costs, and political costs.  Resource costs refer to 
the time and energy that the senator and his/her staff spend on meetings with interest groups, 
constituents, and other political offices.  Political costs entail any backlash that the introduction 
of the bill may cause, such as negative press or lowered approval in the constituency.  When 
legislators sponsor bills, they go on record with their policy positions.  Because of the 
complexity of many measures, political opponents can easily point to sponsored legislation (or 
parts of sponsored measures) as evidence of a legislator's shortcomings.  Finally, opportunity 
costs are the costs associated with sponsoring a measure focusing on one policy—rather than 
another.  Although not specifically addressed by Schiller (1995) the opportunity cost of 
sponsoring legislation can also include other legislative activities, such as roll call voting or 
constituency service.  Schiller argues that “if the legislator is a rational actor, there must be 
benefits attached to bill sponsorship that can outweigh the costs.  These benefits may include 
improvements in public policy, material gains for the senator’s state, and internal and external 
reputations as an issue expert, all of which can contribute to electoral success” (190).   
Schiller’s study reveals that individual, institutional, and state level variables influence 
sponsorship behavior.  At the individual level, senior members and committee chairs were more 
 43 
  
likely to sponsor legislation (see also Sinclair 1989).  This fits well with Schiller’s rational 
choice argument.  As members gain seniority and move into influence positions, the costs of 
sponsorship decrease because these members have a relatively higher degree of policy making 
expertise and skill.  They therefore likely expend less time and energy when sponsoring 
legislation.  Furthermore, leadership roles (such as committee chairmanships) allow legislators to 
more effectively and efficiently pursue their legislative agenda and promote their legislative 
proposals.  As the cost of sponsoring legislation decreases, these legislators are able to sponsor 
more legislation. Very junior legislators, on the other hand, lack policy-making expertise, skill, 
and influence.  Consistent with this reasoning, Schiller (1995) finds that legislators in their first 
two years of service are significantly less likely than their more senior colleagues to sponsor 
legislation.   I therefore expect that seniority will be related to sponsorship activity; relatively 
junior members will have relatively low levels of bill sponsorship. 
Schiller finds that senators with larger legislative staff also have higher levels of 
sponsorship.  A large staff can help the legislator in two ways.  First, the staff can directly assist 
the legislator in writing bills, through researching issues or actually drafting proposals.  Second, 
legislative staff can assist the legislator by taking on tasks other than bill drafting—such as 
constituency service—thus reducing the opportunity costs that might be incurred when 
sponsoring policy proposals.  Staff is a component of the Squire professionalism index.  The 
other two components of the index, pay and average days in session, are also likely to reduce 
opportunity costs.  Legislators who regard legislative service as a full-time career (that is, those 
in more professionalized legislatures) are likely better able to sponsor legislation without 
reducing the amount of time spent in other legislative activities. I therefore expect that legislative 
professionalism will be positively associated with sponsorship activity. 
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Schiller (1995) finds that both ideology and partisanship have little effect on the level of 
bill sponsorship.  These results may be caused by the individualistic nature of the Senate, 
compared to the party-centered atmosphere of the House of Representatives.  Furthermore, in her 
study, it was impossible to determine the effects of chamber control on sponsorship, since the 
Senate was consistently controlled by Democrats.  Nonetheless, the question of the influence of 
partisanship and the influences of majority party control are theoretically important, given the 
majoritarian nature of U.S. legislatures, and the different views the major parties have on the size 
and power of government. 
Garand and Burke (2005) analyze the effect of majority party status, ideology, and 
partisanship on bill sponsorship.  They note that “during periods of Democratic control of the 
U.S. House, it is impossible to distinguish the effect of being a Democrat (Republican) from 
being a member of the majority (minority) party” and that “most of the literature on sponsorship 
and cosponsorship has been focused on time periods of fixed partisan control of the U.S. House” 
(167).  Their analysis of the 102nd to 105th congressional sessions reveals that representatives in 
the majority party were more active in sponsorship than their colleagues in the minority party.  
Indeed, majority party status was a highly significant influence on sponsorship, even above and 
beyond the effects of ideology and partisanship.  Their results show as well that the “Republican 
House members increased their sponsorship activity relative to that of Democrats directly as a 
result of becoming the majority party in the House. Democrats had higher sponsorship rates 
while they were the majority party, and Republicans had higher sponsorship rates after they took 
control of the House (179).   
In keeping with Schiller (1995), Garand and Burke (2005) initially hypothesize that 
ideologically conservative and/or Republican members of the House would have lower levels of 
sponsorship because of their traditional views on the limited role of government. They find that 
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“Republicans do not have the systematically lower levels of sponsorship that we expected; to the 
contrary, there appears to be no systematic difference between Republicans and Democrats in 
their sponsorship behavior” (179).  Garand and Burke (2005) use both a measure of the liberal-
conservative dimension and a measure of ideological extremism12. They find that sponsorship 
rates are somewhat higher among members who are relatively liberal and/or ideologically 
extreme.  They also find that “sponsorship rates are higher among former legislative staffers, 
state legislators, or state and local elected officials, relatively senior, committee or subcommittee 
chairs,  non-Black, and electorally secure as indicated by a large margin of victory in the 
previous election” (180).   
At the state level, the research on sponsorship has primarily focused on the differences in 
bills enacted across different legislatures; that is, the analyses focus on institutions rather than on 
individuals.  For example, recent work by Gary and Lowery (1995) and Squire (1998) uses 
measures of legislative professionalism and interest group activity across the states to explain 
differences in aggregate levels of legislative production.   
The scholarship that examines bill sponsorship at the state level has focused primarily on 
the sponsorship of measures in a particular policy area.   For example, Barnello and Bratton 
(2007) find that personal characteristics such as race, education, age, and family circumstances 
are associated with sponsorship of "women’s issue" legislation by men.  Previous work by 
Thomas (1991), Bratton and Haynie (1999), Reingold (2000), and Swers (2002) suggest that 
female legislators are more likely than their male colleagues to focus on issues that are 
particularly relevant to women.  In a larger context, the research on women’s issue legislation 
                                                           
12
 Garand and Burke (2005) use a DW-Nominate to measure the liberal-conservative dimension, with scores coded 
so that high values represent the more conservative policy positions.  Further, Garand and Burke (2005) measure 
ideological extremism/intensity (or strong policy preferences) with a “folded” DW-Nominate score which is the 
absolute value of the raw DW-Nominate scores. The result is a measure ranging from 0 (pure moderate) to more 
than 1 (intense liberal or conservative). 
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suggests that individual level factors substantially influence levels of participation at the agenda-
setting stage of the legislative process. 
To date only a few studies (Krach 2005; Hogan, Kromer, and Wrzenski 2006) have 
analyzed sponsorship patterns at the state level in a manner similar to the congressional 
scholarship of Schiller (1995) or Garand and Burke (2005). The most comprehensive analysis of 
sponsorship at the state level is conducted by Hogan, Kromer, and Wrzenski (2006), who 
analyze the sponsorship patterns of legislators from twenty state legislatures over two legislative 
sessions (1997-98 and 1999-00).  This approach builds on previous state level research (see Gray 
and Lowery 1995 and Squire 1998) in that it examines the influence of individual, district, and 
institutional factors.  Furthermore, the twenty state sample allows for cross state comparison of a 
number of state-level factors, such as legislative professionalism, interest group strength, and 
public opinion liberalism. The comprehensive nature of this work also allows us to compare the 
behavior of state legislators to on the behavior of members of Congress.  Hogan, Kromer, and 
Wrzenski (2006) find that various state level variables have an impact on sponsorship. First, 
legislators from states with a higher percentage of citizens who self-identify as liberal introduce 
significantly more legislation than their counterparts in relatively conservative states.  It may be 
that legislators view sponsorship as a means to satisfy the constituency demands of good 
governance.  The authors also find that interest group strength has a negative and significant 
relationship to levels of bill sponsorship.  In states with relatively strong interest groups, levels of 
bill sponsorship are relatively low.  Finally, legislators representing heterogeneous districts that 
contain many disparate interests introduce more legislation than legislators representing 
homogeneous populations.  In general, these state level findings suggest that legislators do 
pattern their behavior to meet constituency demands, which is compatible with the cost-benefit 
argument outlined in Chapter 2. 
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Hogan, Kromer, and Wrzenski (2006) also find that legislative professionalism is related 
to bill sponsorship, but (contrary to expectations) bill sponsorship is relatively low in relatively 
professionalized legislatures.  This finding also runs somewhat counter to the earlier work of 
Schiller (1995), who found that increased numbers of legislative staff resulted in a greater 
number of sponsored legislation.  It is possible that legislators in professionalized legislatures are 
more refined in their law making abilities, and are more effective, and therefore introduce fewer 
measures—but more measures which pass.  Furthermore, this research does not measure the size 
or policy area of the bill.  It may be possible that members from professionalized legislature 
sponsor a smaller number of measures with the same number of policy provisions; 
professionalize state legislatures may be more likely to produce omnibus measures, or measures 
with several amendments and riders.  
Consistent with Garand and Burke (2005)'s conclusions regarding sponsorship in 
Congress, Hogan, Kromer, and Wrzenski (2006) find that members in the majority party 
introduce more legislation than minority party members.  Unlike Schiller (1995) and Garand and 
Burke (2005), they find that both partisanship and ideology have a significant impact on bill 
sponsorship.  Consistent with the theory that sponsorship is related to general views on 
government, they fin that conservatives and Republicans, who are often thought to support a 
relatively limited role of government, .  Furthermore, both seniority and committee chairmanship 
significantly affect sponsorship activity.  These findings at the state level are consistent with the 
findings at the Congressional level of Schiller (1995) and Garand and Burke (2005).  Moreover, 
these individual level findings point to the legislator's need to make decisions about how to 





4.2 Variables and Hypotheses 
This research will analyze the determinants of sponsorship (as an indicator of 
participatory behavior) with a variable measuring the total number of bills that an individual 
legislator sponsors during the 2001 legislative session.  As previously noted, this measure does 
not include resolutions. Like Garand and Burke (2005), I control for a variety of individual level 
factors. Furthermore, like Hogan, Kromer, and Wrzenski (2006), I provide controls for 
state/district and institutional level variables.  In the following sections of this chapter, I will 
discuss the hypothesized effects of the independent variables on legislative sponsorship.  
4.2.1 Ideology and Ideological Extremism 
Legislators who are more liberal may be inclined to support a larger, more active role of 
government and therefore may sponsor more legislation.  However, the previous literature has 
drawn mixed conclusions regarding the effects of ideology.  Schiller (1995) finds that ideology 
does not significantly affect sponsorship activity, while Hogan, Kromer, and Wrzenski, and 
Garand and Burke (2005) find that as a legislator’s ideology becomes more liberal, they are more 
likely to sponsor legislation.  In keeping with the state level finding of Hogan, Kromer, and 
Wrzenski (2006), I hypothesize that more liberal legislators will sponsor more legislation.    
Members who are ideologically extreme may sponsor fewer bills because their 
ideological preference is outside the median preference of the floor.  These members may feel 
disenfranchised and choose not to participate in this legislative function.  On the other hand, 
ideologically extreme legislators may find that the agenda-setting stage of the legislative process 
is the stage at which they can most effectively exercise their voice.  Indeed, bill sponsorship may 
represent a unique opportunity for these members to make their preferred policies visible.  
Placing policies on the legislative agenda may be a first step to moving those policies into the 
mainstream of public debate Hogan, Kromer, and Wrzenski (2006) test the effect of ideological 
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extremism on sponsorship, but finds no effect.  I hypothesize that ideologically extreme 
members will sponsor more legislation than their moderate counterparts.      
4.2.2 Political Party 
Previous researches on the effect of political party are mixed.  Garand and Burke (2005) 
find that Republicans introduce more legislation than Democrats, while at the state level Karch 
(2005) finds that party has no effect on sponsorship.  Hogan, Kromer, and Wrzenski (2006) find 
that Republicans sponsor less legislation than do Democrats.  I expect that the effect of party will 
be similar to the effect of ideology; in other words, I expect that Republicans will introduce less 
legislation because of their support for a limited role of government.   
4.2.3 Majority Party 
Keeping with the findings of Garand and Burke (2005), I hypothesize that legislators in 
the chamber's majority party will sponsor more legislation than those in the minority party. 
Being a member of the majority party facilitates the introduction process; those in the majority 
party have more influence over the final form and outcome of the bills that are placed on the 
legislative agenda.   
4.2.4 Seniority, Freshman, and Retirement 
Three variables are used to measure the effect of careerism on legislative sponsorship: 
seniority, freshman, and retirement.  The seniority and freshman variables reflect the role of 
informational costs and institutional knowledge in conditioning sponsorship behavior. Senior 
members have already traveled a relatively long way on the bill sponsorship “learning curve.” 
These members have developed bill drafting expertise and have established relationships with 
staff and interest groups who can assist them in researching drafting the legislation).  Moreover, 
senior members are likely relatively well respected within the institution and have developed 
relationships with both the chamber leadership.  They can more efficiently and effectively 
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sponsor a higher number of measures.  In short, more senior legislators, by gaining institutional 
knowledge, have decreased levels of informational costs. Drawing on the findings of Hogan, 
Kromer, and Wrzenski (2006), I hypothesize that seniority will be positively related to bill 
sponsorship.  Furthermore, I expect the inverse effect for newly elected representatives.  In 
keeping with the reasoning above, I expect that first year members will introduce less legislation 
than other members.   
What is the effect of impending retirement on sponsorship activity?  Work by Hibbing 
(1991) and others suggest that the members in their last term of service are less active than other 
members.  Herrick, Moore, and Hibbing (1994) find the legislators who do not plan to run again 
introduce fewer pieces of legislation.  This finding suggests that members respond to electoral 
pressure, and that those who are retiring may have less of an incentive to introduce legislation 
because they are no longer constrained by their electorate.  Moreover, members who know that 
they will not be present in future years may be less likely to use sponsorship as a means to reach 
long-term policy goals.  In other words, without the fear of losing reelection, members may shirk 
on their sponsorship duties. I expect that legislators in their (voluntary) last term of service will 
sponsor less legislation than continuing members.   
4.2.5 Previous Elective Experience and Freshman/Experience Interaction 
As outlined above, I expect that seniority will lead to greater knowledge of the legislative 
process, and therefore decrease information costs, leading to more sponsorship activity.  I 
likewise expect that legislators with previous political experience will sponsor more legislation. 
It is likely that legislators with previous political experience have a legislative agenda already in 
mind when they enter legislative service.  And because they have a better understanding of the 
legislative process, they likely have the skills and the networking abilities to more efficiently and 
effectively implement that agenda.  Prior work has not examined the effect of prior experience 
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on sponsorship activity, in part because of lack of available data.  I expect that legislators with 
previous experience in elected public office will sponsor more legislation than legislators who 
are relatively new to politics.  I also expect that the costs of gathering information about the 
legislative process will be most pronounced for those who lack experience both outside of and 
within the chamber.  Therefore, I expect that the effect of experience will be most pronounced 
for newly elected legislators who have no prior political experience. 
4.2.6 Party Leader and Committee Chair 
Two dichotomous variables are used to examine the relationship between sponsorship 
activity and serving in a leadership position within the chamber.  Legislative leaders are more 
involved with all aspects of the legislative process than the typical rank and file members. They 
have greater power over the legislative agenda, thus can put their legislation on the docket with 
greater ease. Furthermore, leaders may use their sponsorship activity as a signal to the rest of the 
legislative body. Committee chairs may enjoy some of the same legislative perks as those in the 
leadership.  Committee chairs will also have greater control over the legislative agenda than the 
typical rank and file member.  Finally, I suspect that some rank and file members will look to 
committee chairs and legislative leaders to sponsor some of their legislative initiatives (thus, 
ensuring that the bill gets full consideration). Hogan, Kromer, and Wrzenski (2006) test the 
impact of both leadership and chairmanship on sponsorship.  He finds that being a committee 
chair has a positive effect on bill sponsorship, and (although barely significant) a small, positive 
effect of leadership position on bill sponsorship.  I hypothesize that legislators who are leaders or 
committee chairs will sponsor more legislation than other legislators.   
4.2.7 Gender 
Scholars have consistently found that the sex of a legislator influences sponsorship 
activity.  Thomas (1991) and Swers (2002) find that women are more likely to sponsor women’s 
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issue legislation than their male counterparts.  Bratton and Haynie (1999) find that women are 
more likely to sponsor legislation across a number of issue areas, including women's issues, 
health policy, education policy, welfare policy, or children's policy.  When interviewing state 
legislators in Arizona and California, Reingold (1992) found that female legislators – and some 
of their male colleagues – generally perceived women as better able to represent women.  But 
both men and women were often ambivalent about that representational connection, and stressed 
that there was more that were more similarities than differences in the ways in which men and 
women approached representation (Reingold 1992). Given the possibility that women will see 
"women" as a separate constituency, I expect that female legislators will sponsor more bills than 
their male counterparts.   
4.2.8 Previous Electoral Margin 
 Bill sponsorship can be a way for a legislator to stake out relatively popular positions on 
salient issues.  That is, bill sponsorship can be used as a form of advertisement for the legislator, 
and a way to gaining recognition and support from their constituents.  From this perspective, 
those who won the last election by a relatively small margin would find sponsorship activity 
most beneficial; those who won their seats by a large margin may not need to increase 
sponsorship to maintain their seat. 
However, electorally vulnerable legislators may find it more advantageous to spend their 
time electioneering in their districts, or providing constituency service for voters and potential 
voters.  Members who are electorally secure can spend less time on electioneering activities and 
more time on pursuing their public policy goals.  Consistent with the findings of Garand and 
Burke (2005), I expect that members who won a large margin of victory in the previous election 
to sponsor more legislation.  In other words, electoral security brings the gift of time to devote to 
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agenda-setting activities within the legislators; less electorally secure legislators must focus on 
electioneering activities. 
4.2.9 Professionalism 
Professional legislatures have greater staff support to assist in drafting and researching 
legislative measures, thus making it easier for legislators to introduce legislation.  Gray and 
Lowery (1995) suggest that sponsorship levels are higher in more professionalized chambers.  
Contrary to expectations, however, Hogan, Kromer, and Wrzenski. (2006) find a negative 
relationship between professionalism and bill sponsorship (i.e. as professionalism increases, the 
number of bills sponsored decreases).  This negative effect may be in part of a “gate keeping” 
function.  Chambers with a large staff may more effectively sort out measures before they are 
placed on the legislative agenda, removing duplication or unnecessary measures, and combining 
bills which share similar policy objectives.  The norms within more professionalized legislatures 
may discourage the introduction of bills that are destined for failure.  Furthermore, legislators 
from professionalized legislators may feel more pressure from interest groups to not sponsor 
legislation.  Given the mix of theoretical expectations and findings, I therefore have no specific 
expectation regarding the relationship between professionalism and bill sponsorship. 
4.2.10 Term Limits 
Since the majority of work on sponsorship is conducted at the congressional level, little is 
known about the effect of term limits on sponsorship behavior. Other scholars (see Herrick, 
Moore, and Hibbing 1994) suggest that legislators who know that their careers will be short will 
be likely to specialize in order to enact their personal policy agenda before their time is up.  That 
is term limits may encourage members to aggressively and quickly pursue their goals.  Glazer 
and Wattenberg (1996) likewise suggest that term limits will encourage members to spend less 
time focusing on their own reelection prospects and more time focusing on legislative activities.    
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I therefore expect that legislators from states that are term limited will sponsor more legislation 
than legislators from non-term limited states.   
4.2.11 Public Opinion Liberalism 
States with a more liberal citizenry may prefer a more activist government, and thus 
legislators will be more active in sponsorship.  This is consistent with the findings of Hogan, 
Kromer, and Wrzenski (2006).   I therefore hypothesize a positive relationship between public 
opinion liberalism and bill sponsorship.  
4.2.12 Distance  
Trips to the state capital are more difficult and costly to state legislators living in far away 
districts.  Furthermore, their local news may devote relatively little coverage to the legislative 
process unfolding in the capital city.  Moreover, legislators who live far from the capital may 
find it relatively important to maintain visible connections with the district.  They may be more 
likely, therefore, to focus on constituency service than their colleagues who live close to the 
capital, and there may be more of a trade-off between policy work that occurs within the 
chamber and electoral efforts that take place outside of the capitol.  Although the distance 
variable has been tested in the rational abstention literature (see Rothenberg and Sanders 2000, 
2002), it has not been tested as a factor effecting bill sponsorship at either the state or national 
levels.  I hypothesize that as the distance from the capital increases, the number of bills 
sponsored will decrease.   
4.2.13 Social Diversity  
The social diversity variable measures the demographic heterogeneity of a district.  This 
dissertation research measures social diversity with an index developed by Sullivan (1973), 
where high values indicate that citizens within a district are relatively diverse.  Previous research 
on state level bill introduction has suggested that total population, urbanization, and 
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industrialization have a positive relationship with bill introduction (Rosenthal and Forth 1978).  
Several scholars find that racial diversity within a district is associated with the sponsorship of 
policies of particular interest to African Americans (e.g., Bratton and Haynie 1999; Grose 2005). 
However, Gray and Lowery (1995) find few direct district level effects on aggregate bill 
sponsorship.  Hogan, Kromer, and Wrzenski (2006) is the only study to date that examines the 
role of a general measure of district social diversity on bill sponsorship.  They find a positive 
relationship between social diversity and bill sponsorship.  In other words, legislators 
representing heterogeneous districts introduce more legislation than do legislators representing 
homogeneous populations.  This finding suggests that legislators are responding to constituency 
demands through their sponsorship behavior; as district population becomes more diverse, 
legislators sponsor more legislation in order to address the needs and interests of those multiple 
constituencies.  Like Hogan, Kromer, Wrzenski (2006) and Rosenthal and Forth (1978), I expect 
that social diversity will have a positive effect on bill sponsorship.   
4.3 Model and Results 
What are the determinants of legislative sponsorship?  In order to empirically answer this 
question, an ordinary least squares13 multiple regression analysis using the total number of bills 
introduced by a legislator is conducted.  Table 10 provides the results from three different 
models:  a fixed effects model, a random effects model, and a mixed model.  The mixed model 
includes all individual level variables described above, in addition to the three state level 
variables described above (a measure of legislative professionalism, a measure for citizen 
liberalism within the state, and a dummy variable for term limits,).  It also includes six dummy 
variables to control to the degree possible for other state-level effects on sponsorship which 
                                                           
13 Some scholars (see King, 1988) would argue that a negative binomial regression would be the more appropriate 
statistical model given the event count nature of the dependent variable.  In addition to the OLS analysis, I 
conducted the same analysis using negative binomial regression (see Table 12). The results were virtually identical.   
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cannot be measured—such as norms or traditions within the legislature that change average 
sponsorship levels, or the political culture of the state.  Because of the inclusion of the three 
state-level variables, only six dummy variables could be included.  The fixed effects model, on 
the other hand, eliminates the three state level variables (professionalism, citizen liberalism, and 
term limits) and includes nine state dummy variables to control for state-level effects on 
sponsorship.  Note that the only difference between the "fixed effects" and "mixed" models is 
that the mixed model excludes three of the state-level dummies in order to include three state-
level substantive variables; therefore, the individual-level effects are the same in the two models.  
Finally, the random effects model eliminates all the state dummy variables, but does include the 
three state-level variables (professionalism, citizen liberalism, and term limits).  
In my discussion of the effects of the individual level variables on sponsorship, I will 
focus on the "fixed effects" and "mixed" models, which include the most rigorous controls. The 
independent variables included in the model predict about 37% of the variance in sponsorship.  
The most powerful effects on sponsorship appear to be related to career, partisanship or 
ideology, and position within the chamber.  As expected, majority party members sponsor more 
measures; conservatives sponsor fewer measures.  Contrary to Hogan, Kromer, and Wrzenski 
(2006) and consistent with Garand and Burke (2005), I find that Republicans introduce about 
three more bills than legislators from other political parties.  However, it should be noted that 
auxiliary regression analyses indicate that this negative and significant effect is due to the 
inclusion of legislator ideology (measured through the W-Nominate score) in the model—that is, 
only after we control for individual ideology do we find that Republicans sponsor more 
measures.  Once legislator ideology is removed from the analysis, Republicans introduce 
significantly fewer measures than Democrats. 
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Table 11: OLS Regression: Effects of Legislator, Institutional, and State Factors on 
Sponsorship 






Variables Estimate Std. Err Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. 
Individual Level       
Seniority .14 .14 .14 .14 .10 .14 
Freshman -3.61** .91 -3.61** .91 -5.79** 1.02 
Retirement 1.35 .94 1.35 .94 1.80+ 1.01 
Leadership Position 1.45 2.25 1.45 2.25 -.68 2.44 
Committee Chair 3.15** 1.01 3.15** 1.01 2.82** 1.08 




.94 1.15 .94 1.15 3.52** 1.26 
Gender -1.25 .84 -1.25 .84 -1.67+ .88 
Party 3.62* 1.84 3.62* 1.84 .98 1.96 
Majority Party 4.31** .72 4.31** .72 4.15** .80 
Ideology 
(W-Nominate) 
-4.25** 1.35 -4.25** 1.35 -2.73+ 1.41 
 
Ideological Extremity .40 1.71 .40 1.71 3.60* 1.68 
Previous Electoral 
Margin 
1.80 1.92 1.80 1.92 5.96** 2.07 
Distance -.89* .45 -.89* .45 .06 .36 
Social Diversity  -.54 10.71 -.54 10.71 13.23 9.63 
State Level       
Legislative 
Professionalisma 
.41** .05   .17** .03 
Citizen Ideology -.66** .07   -.04 .06 
Term Limits 1.82 1.30   -5.68** .95 
State Dummies       
Arkansas   4.25* 1.72   
California   15.90** 1.81   
Colorado -22.09** 1.54 -.40 1.31   
Florida -11.19** .86 4.32* 1.74   
Illinois 3.51* 1.55 13.46** 1.72   
Maryland       
Michigan -5.30** 1.48 8.03** 1.72   
North Carolina -8.21** 1.55 6.12** 1.56   
New Mexico 5.86** 1.79 6.23** 1.65   
Texas   17.60** 1.77   
Constant 33.17
** 5.17 2.20 4.43 .50 .92 
R
2
 .37  .37  .26  
Number of Legislators 885  885  885  
a:   Squire index is transformed so that higher values=more professional 
*:   p≤.05, two-tailed test **:   p≤.05, two-tailed test 
+:  p≤.05, one-tailed test 
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Table 12:  Negative Binomial Regression: Effects of Legislator, Institutional, and State 
Factors on Sponsorship 






Variables Estimate Std. Err Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. 
Individual Level       
Seniority .01 .01 .01 .01 <.01 .01 
Freshman -.33** .06 -.33** .06 -.50** .07 
Retirement .09+ .05 .09+ .05 .15* .06 
Leadership Position .11 .13 .11 .13 -.05 .13 
Committee Chair .18** .05 .18** .05 .15** .05 




.07 .09 .07 .09 .27** .10 
Gender -.07 .05 -.07 .05 -.12** .05 
Party .27* .12 .27* .12 .12 .14 
Majority Party .28** .04 .28** .04 .24** .05 
Ideology 
(W-Nominate) 
-.22** .08 -.22** .08 -.15+ .09 
 
Ideological Extremity .06 .10 .06 .10 .27* .11 
Previous Electoral 
Margin 
.15 .12 .15 .12 .43** .13 
Distance -.05* .02 -.05* .02 .01 .02 
Social Diversity  .14 .56 .14 .56 1.22* .51 
State Level       
Legislative 
Professionalisma 
.02** <.01   .01** <.01 
 
Citizen Ideology -.04** <.01   <.01 <.01 
Term Limits .21** .08   -.35** .06 
State Dummies       
Arkansas   -.69 .11   
California       
Colorado -1.63** .10 -1.28** .09   
Florida -.86** .07 -.88** .07   
Illinois .27** .09 -.19** .09   
Maryland   -1.05** .14   
Michigan -.32** .09 -.48** .09   
North Carolina -.40** .09 -.59** .12   
New Mexico .42** .12 -.61** .10   
Texas   -.01 .09   
Constant 3.53




 1262.22**  367.8**  
Number of Legislators 885  885  885  
a:   Squire index is transformed so that higher values=more professional 
*:   p≤.05, two-tailed test**:   p≤.05, two-tailed test+ :  p≤.05, one-tailed test 
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The effect of seniority on sponsorship is quite small in magnitude and statistically 
insignificant.  However, I find that, as expected, new legislators sponsor fewer measures than 
their more established counterparts, and committee chairs sponsor a relatively high number of 
measures.  These findings provides support for the argument that freshman members may be 
hindered by their lack of institutional knowledge, and that relatively influential legislators have 
more resources and incentives to sponsors a relatively high number of measures.  Surprisingly, 
the results indicate that members who are retiring sponsor more bills than those hoping to 
continue on in the next legislative session, although this result is only significant in the negative 
binomial regression, and then only marginally so. The direction of the effect of "retirement" is 
counter to both my hypothesis and the congressional findings of Hibbing (1991) and Herrick, 
Moore, and Hibbing (1994).  It may be that legislators in their final term of service are making 
the most out of their remaining time in the legislature and want to sponsor as much legislation as 
possible.  
Legislators who serve in top leadership positions sponsor more measures, but not 
significantly more measures, than others in the chamber.  It may be that members of the 
leadership are too busy with other duties to frequently sponsor their own legislation.  Perhaps 
most surprising, legislators with previous elected office experience were less likely to sponsor 
legislation (although the coefficient was small).  It may be that these legislators are more skilled, 
thus only introducing a few bills with a higher probability of passage 
Ideological extremists introduced more bills, as expected, but the effect was significant 
only in the random effects model.  Electoral margin is, as expected, positively related to 
sponsorship, but again is only significant in the random effects model.  Distance from the capital 
is, as expected, significantly related to sponsorship; legislators who live far from the capital 
introduce fewer measures. What were the effects of the state-level variables (professionalism, 
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citizen liberalism, and term limits)?  In the fixed effects (and mixed) model, legislative 
professionalism is positively related to sponsorship—the more professional a legislature, the 
more sponsorship activity takes place.  Citizen liberalism also significantly influences 
sponsorship, but in a negative direction, which is counter to expectations.  It may be that citizen 
liberalism may influence the type of measures introduced, rather than the overall number of 
measures; here, the dependent variable is simply a count and does not take into account the 
ideological tone of the bill.   
Is the significance of the results affected by the association across the variables?  Not 
surprisingly, there is a substantial degree of multicollinearity in the sponsorship analysis.  In a 
multivariate regression, the variables for party, legislator ideology, professionalism rank, term 
limits, and citizen ideology all have VIF scores above 4.  However, collinearity will not alter the 
magnitude of the parameter estimates, but will only inflate the standard errors of the estimates; 
both partisanship ("Republican") and legislator ideology ("Conservativism") are statistically 
significant in both an OLS regression analysis and in the event count (negative binomial) 
analysis. Therefore, the high degree of collinearity does not influence the interpretation of the 
results.   
It is not surprising that the three variables that do not vary within states (professionalism 
rank, term limits, and citizen ideology) are highly collinear with each other.  Therefore, the 
standard errors and significance of the estimated effects of these variables are somewhat difficult 
to interpret.  Moreover, including both the dummy variables and the state level variables makes it 
somewhat difficult to interpret the coefficients of the state level variables, since they essentially 
represent the effects of the excluded states.  At the same time, since there are three state-level 
variables, it is difficult to interpret the meaning the effects of the state dummies in the analysis 
where the state-level variables are omitted. 
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To address these difficulties, in addition to calculating VIF scores to assess collinearity, I 
also performed a set of thirty-five auxiliary regressions, each omitting a different set of state 
dummy variables, but including the three state level variables.  In almost all states, regardless of 
what set of dummy variables was excluded, the coefficient for professionalism ranking was 
positive, and it was statistically significant in a substantial majority of cases.  Note that the 
significant coefficient present in Table 11 suggests that collinearity is not an issue in the fixed 
effects regression that is present.  Professionalism appears to be clearly positively related to 
sponsorship activity.  The findings for citizen liberalism are less conclusive, but in about 70% of 
the auxiliary regressions, citizen ideology is negatively and significantly related to sponsorship—
the more liberal a state, the less sponsorship activity takes place.  The findings for term limits are 
much more mixed; whether the effect is positive or negative, and whether it is significant, 
depends largely on the choice of states to include in an analysis.   
4.4 Discussion 
What have we learned from these analyses?  That is, who participates?  In general, the 
results indicate that majority party members, liberal legislators, committee chairs, and those who 
live close to the capital sponsor more legislation than their colleagues.  Legislators who serve in 
professionalized states are generally more active; legislators who serve in relatively liberal states 
and who have prior political experience are somewhat less active.  First year members sponsor 
fewer measures. 
I previously argued the given the increased constraints on a legislator’s time, trade-offs 
have to be made. Although Chapter 6 will more directly address the role of trade-offs in 
participatory behavior, the findings in this chapter suggest that legislators are making decisions 
based on opportunity costs.  First year members may not have the same set of skills and level of 
expertise as more established members, and therefore sponsor fewer measures.   Members who 
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live far from the state capital have higher transportation costs and as a result participate less in 
the capital centered activity of bill sponsorship.  More generally, the results of the majority party 
and committee chairmanship variables suggest that as the relative ease (or decreased cost) of 
sponsorship decreases the level of sponsorship rises.  Majority party members and committee 
chairs are more able to get their bills on the docket and will not experience the same obstacles as 
members of the minority party or non-chairs.  Further, because of the power they yield over the 
legislative body, these legislators may receive more “help” from interest groups in bill 
composition and research (thus, decreasing the informational costs).  Likewise, members serving 
in relatively professionalized legislatures are better equipped to efficiently and effectively place 
measures on the legislative agenda. 
There are several promising avenues for future research.  Some of the questions raised by 
this and previous research focus on whether the individual-level and state-level variables 
influence not only the amount of legislation introduced, but also the type of legislation 
introduced.  Therefore, future research should focus on the introduction of bills that pass.  
Furthermore, an analysis of “key bills” or bills with high salience would be beneficial.  It may be 
that quality legislators are more likely to pass legislation or focus their efforts on legislation of 
higher importance.  Future research could also distinguish bills based on policy area or 
ideological tone, to better sort out the effects of partisanship and constituency. 
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CHAPTER 5: PARTICIPATION AND ABSENTEEISM 
 
The previous chapter examined sponsorship as one measure of legislative participation.  
What other activities may also be used as a measure of participation?   One of the most studied 
legislative activities is the roll call or floor vote.  In this chapter, I build on prior research by 
analyzing legislative shirking.  Both sponsorship and shirking tap into legislative participation, 
but do so in fundamentally different ways.  Legislators make choices about bills to sponsor—and 
through a legislative session, implicitly make choices about bills not to sponsor.  Yet they are 
never called to visibly express their decision not to sponsor, and the decision not to sponsor a bill 
is not recorded.  In contrast, legislators must make a clear, visible choice to participate or not to 
participate in each roll call vote.  By analyzing the determinants of both forms of participation, I 
will be able to draw conclusions on the trade-offs that legislators make with their scarce time.  
Are the two forms of participation related?  Do members with high levels of bill sponsorship 
activity also have strong roll call attendance records?  Or, with the growing time constraints that 
legislators face, do they make trade-offs between their legislative activities, leading to little or no 
association between sponsorship activity and roll call attendance?   To fully understand 
participation, it is important to understand non-participation.   
This chapter will proceed as follows:  I begin with a review of the relevant literature, 
which is focused heavily on the concept of rational abstention.  Second, I develop a model of 
determinants of absenteeism.  This model includes the sponsorship variable from Chapter 4, to 
examine the relationship between the two forms of participation.  I also include all the 
independent variables included in the earlier analyses of sponsorship, in order to make the results 
as comparable as possible.  Finally, I draw conclusions regarding the determinants of legislative 




5.1 Previous Research on Roll Call Participation 
What is the relationship between participation and non-participation? Most legislators 
participate on roll call votes.  Further, most roll call votes at both the state and national levels are 
decided by a wide margin with a very predictable outcome.  Some scholars view participation in 
roll call voting as a signaling activity. Mayhew (1974), for example, sees roll call voting as a 
way legislators signal their constituents about their stands on issues. According to a narrow 
interpretation of his analysis—the interpretation that Mayhew himself presents—only the signal 
itself, and not the legislative outcome, is important to the legislator.  Legislative activity is solely 
about position-taking, and not about the pursuit of policy preferences.  From the Mayhewian 
perspective, therefore, absenteeism matters because it sends a signal about the representation 
being provided to the constituent—that is, no representation at all.  Cohen and Noll note that “the 
most common explanation holds that abstention is harmful to legislators because their 
constituents are likely to interpret a poor participation record as evidence of poor representation” 
(99).The choice to cast a yea or nay vote on legislation may be a signal to the either the party 
leadership or the electoral constituency that the legislator is on-board and a committed member 
of the party, or is actively representing the constituency's interests in the chamber. 
Public choice perspectives often characterize turnout and absenteeism as influenced by 
the benefits and costs of voting.  The “calculus of voting”, developed by Downs (1957) and 
refined by Riker and Ordeshook (1968), maintains that the value of participation is a function of 
the interaction of a probability that an individual's participation would change the outcome and 
the benefits which would accrue to the individual if the preferred outcome was realized, less the 
costs of participation.  However, there are several well-known challenges to this theoretical 
perspective.  When applied to mass participation, voting turnout is actually higher than one 
would expect given a "rational model".  In part, this is because of the nature of the costs and 
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benefits involved, which are relatively low (see Aldrich 1993, 1997; Mueller,1989).  Moreover, 
the benefits to would-be voters may include a feeling of satisfaction from satisfying one's civic 
duty, or casting a ballot in support of the preferred candidate.  Such a benefit can still be 
compatible with a rational choice perspective, as it is linked to self-interest.  What is less 
compatible, however, is the argument that individual in the mass public are altruistic, and incur 
the costs of voting merely to pursue the interests of the community as a whole. 
The rational choice perspective may work better when studying participation at the elite 
level.  First, there are both higher costs and more substantial benefits to participation.  Roll call 
voting allows elected officials an opportunity to actually influence policy, and to receive benefits 
more quickly and with greater certainty than do voters choosing among candidates in an election.  
Legislators may act for the good of the community—but in such a small community, almost 
everything affects the individual in some manner.  Even if a bill does not pass, the act of staking 
out a position—particularly a position that is compatible with a legislator's party and 
constituency—may bring electoral benefits.  Moreover, in terms of sheer numbers, the one roll 
call vote of a single legislator is far more likely to make a difference than the vote of a single 
constituent in a state-level or Congressional election.  Legislative votes can also signal policy 
preferences to other legislators—that is, roll call votes can provide information to other 
legislators, and can persuade other legislators to support (or oppose) a policy.  And, even when 
measures fail, those measures may well be considered another day—and this may be particularly 
likely in close votes.  That is, a single roll call vote may not contribute to a winning outcome in 
the short term, but may contribute to the likelihood that an issue will be considered again.  
Further, legislators, through direct contacts with interest groups, party leaders, and other sources 
of expert information, are likely better able to accurately assess the costs and benefits of each 
choice, whereas at the mass level, the costs of not voting are typically low.  In the legislative 
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setting, where participation is considered more obligatory, the costs of not voting are more 
apparent.  Substandard participation rates may be portrayed by a challenger as a dereliction of a 
member’s legislative duties, and missing a particular vote may be interpreted (and publicized) by 
interest groups as opposition to the group’s agenda.  
As legislative voting data has become readily available, numerous scholars (see Poole 
and Rosenthal 1997 for an example) have used roll call data to analyze voting behavior.  
However, most legislative studies have only focused on the actual preferences expressed—rather 
than on the decision to express a preference.  Although limited, the work done on absenteeism 
has provided a strong theoretical basis for the work in this dissertation.  Cohen and Noll (1991), 
Poole and Rosenthal (1997), and Rothenberg and Sanders (1999, 2000a, 2000b, and 2002), 
which are developed in the specific context of the US Congress, and Scully (1997) and Noury's 
(2004) work on abstention in the European Parliament are examples of such studies.   
Cohen and Noll (1991) analyzed the abstentions on eight roll calls on the Clinch River 
Breeder Reactor Project that took place between 1975 and 1982.  The major focus of their work 
is the complex relationship between the decision to vote, and the preference expressed through 
voting, and constituency characteristics. Controlling for each representative's overall proclivity 
to participate, they observe that “on virtually all roll call votes, the outcome is virtually certain 
and winning margins are very large…high rates of voting combined with virtually certain 
outcomes are at odds with a naïve instrumental theory of voting” (99).  They model legislative 
behavior as being motivated primarily by re-election, rather than by a desire to influence the 
actual policy outcomes.  More specifically, their model of legislative voting is based on the 
assumptions that incumbents maximize reelection probabilities and that citizens make 
retrospective judgments.  They hypothesize that abstention will be greatest among those (1) who 
are program supporters; (2) whose constituency is conflicted and are more likely to vote on the 
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losing side in a lopsided votes; and (3) who are indifferent when outcomes appear certain.  In 
general, they find that abstention is not random among supporters and opponents of a bill.  
Where Cohen and Noll analyzed a limited amount of roll call votes over a small time 
frame, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) addressed the problem of selection bias and generalizabiltity 
by analyzing abstention over the entire history of the US Congress.  Unlike Cohen and Noll 
(where the primary focus was the connection between reelection and abstention) Poole and 
Rosenthal employed the spatial theory of voting and focused on the likelihood that a member of 
Congress is pivotal rather than on her reelection motive.  Congressional roll calls are similar to 
two-candidate elections in that they involve choices between two alternatives, and can therefore 
be studied with the well known decision-theoretic model developed by Downs (1957) and Riker 
and Ordeshook (1968): 
R= PB – C + D 
Poole and Rosenthal apply this equation as follows: R is the net reward for voting; PB is 
the instrumental benefit of voting, were B is the voter’s utility gain if the side he or she favor’s 
win and P is the subjective probability that the voter assigns to his or her chances of casting the 
decisive vote; C is the fixed costs (such as the opportunity cost of the time spent voting); D is the 
fixed benefits (such as the sense of citizen’s duty) (211).   
Poole and Rosenthal maintain that abstention should be induced by indifference to the 
alternative choices, close votes, voting costs, program support rather than opposition, and the 
size of the legislative body.  They test five major hypotheses in their research; (1) turnout should 
be inversely related to the degree of indifference, as measured by spatial utilities computed from 
D-NOMINATE coordinates; (2) turnout should be higher when preferences on a roll call are 
evenly divided rather than being lopsided; (3) turnout should decrease as the cost of voting 
increases; (4) turnout should be higher on the minority side of an issue than on the “silent” 
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majority side; and (5) turnout should decrease as the number of members of the legislative body 
increases (210).   
Poole and Rosenthal conclude that fixed costs matter; they find that travel time to 
Washington, DC, from a member’s home district does vary systematically over time, and is 
related to abstention.  Their findings indicate that the decrease in prolonged abstention is related 
to advances in transportation technology, communication technology, and health care.  In terms 
of a general theory of abstention, they maintain that “a good overall turnout record on roll call 
votes may benefit one’s reputation among constituents, but the value of the benefit may vary 
across individual legislators over time.  Similarly, the cost of being present in Washington may 
vary over time and cross-sectionally particularly because different members have different travel 
times from Washington to their constituency” (212).  Historically, they find that members 
“trapped in Washington” by distant districts abstained less.  Similarly, they find that non-
continuing members – who presumably will gain the least benefit from voting – vote at much 
lower levels than their colleagues.  Poole and Rosenthal note that “most of the increase in lame-
duck shirking has occurred in the past 100 years.” (220).   
In terms of P (the subjective probability that the voter assigns to his or her chances of 
casting the decisive vote) Poole and Rosenthal find that the lopsided roll call votes have a higher 
abstention rate.  In other words, members are more likely to cast a vote if it is more likely to 
make a difference.  Poole and Rosenthal use the B term to test their theories on indifference.  
They find that “regarding the results on indifference, the attractiveness of abstention (relative to 
participation) is inversely related to the B term” (223).  In other words, the expected pattern of 
indifference (turnout should be inversely related to the degree of indifference, as measured by 
spatial utilities computed from D-NOMINATE coordinates) is only present on close votes.  
Poole and Rosenthal suggest that this result can be explained by the alienation of ideologically 
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extreme members.  Poole and Rosenthal do little in terms of addressing the D (the fixed benefits 
of voting) term.  However, members who have consistently high participation levels may be 
viewed by their fellow legislators as being reliable and predictable--bringing about more respect 
within the legislature. 
Rothenberg and Sanders (1999, 2000a, 2000b, and 2002) constructed unified model of 
roll call participation.  Their work as attempted to correct the major critiques of the earlier work 
done by Cohen and Noll (1991) and Poole and Rosenthal (1997), including selection bias and a 
lack of generalizability, as well as a lack of statistical controls at both the legislator and bill 
levels..  Rothenberg and Sanders develop a model that incorporates the role of individual, 
district, and bill characteristics on legislative abstention.  Their model specifies legislators’ 
preferences over actions (voting Yea, voting Nay, or abstaining) as a function of utility 
differentials and the costs and benefits of voting.  They find that participation in Congress 
depends most heavily on factors beyond a desire to affect outcome (lending support to Mayhew’s 
signaling theory).  They find the strongest effects on C factors; the timing of a vote, and the day 
of the week on which it takes place, both have substantial effects on levels of abstention.  
Rothenberg and Sanders conclude that legislators are shirking on their roll call voting duties in 
order to perform other functions of their job, such as electioneering and constituency service 
activities.  
Rothenberg and Sanders (2000) brings an interesting distinction to this body of literature.  
What happens when legislators are freed of their electoral constraints?  Do members behave 
differently if they are voluntarily retiring from their position?  Rothenberg and Sanders find that 
members of Congress who decide to exit their office “cut back substantially on their effort level 
and reject the backbreaking schedule of the average House member” (322).  In other words, 
when the electoral connection is severed and the member is no longer concerned with the 
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repercussions of abstention they participate less.  In other words, shirking is reduced when 
representatives know they may be held accountable for their behavior. 
There has only been a single state level study specifically addressing of roll call 
participation.  Recent work by Wright (2007) focuses on the effects of term limits on roll call 
vote participation. Wright (2007) hypothesizes that “roll call participation rates for term limited 
members will be lower than it is among those who are seeking reelection” (262).  Wright goes on 
to hypothesize that “the level of shirking on roll call participation should be proportional to the 
effort required to make these votes” (262) and that the effect of term limits should be especially 
pronounced in professionalized legislatures.  Wright argues that participation in citizen 
legislatures is not driven by a fear of punishment, but a general sense of obligation to the citizens 
they represent therefore taking away reelection possibilities will have a diminished effect.  On 
the other hand, legislators from professionalized legislators participate because they have a lot at 
stake. Maestas (2000) uses a “stick and carrot” argument, where the combination of career and 
salary act as the carrot and reelection as the stick. Thus term limits essentially take away the 
stick.  Wright finds that term limits have a conditioning effect on legislative professionalism in 
terms of participation.  The interaction of professionalism and term limits are as expected; they 
have a negative and significant effect on legislative participation.  However, the independent 
effects of term limits and professionalism are just the opposite.  Legislators from 
professionalized legislatures have higher rates of roll call participation, as well as legislators 
from term limited states.   
5.2 Variables and Hypotheses 
 This research will analyze the determinants of absenteeism (as an indicator of 
participatory behavior) with a ratio variable measuring the proportion of bills in which a member 
did not cast a “yea” or “nay” vote on during the 2001 legislative session.  Similar to the previous 
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work done by Rothenberg and Sanders (2002) and Wright (2007), I provide controls for 
individual, state and institutional level variables.  This section will discuss the hypothesized 
effects of the independent variables on legislative absenteeism. 
5.2.1 Bill Sponsorship 
To test the relationship between participation (bill sponsorship) and nonparticipation (roll 
call absenteeism), this analysis will include the sponsorship variable from Chapter 4 as an 
independent variable.  What is the relationship between participation and nonparticipation?  Do 
legislators who actively participate in one legislative activity, actively participate on other 
legislative activities? More specifically, are legislators who frequently sponsor legislation more 
likely to show up to vote than legislators with low levels of sponsorship activities? 
 If sponsorship and roll call absenteeism are negatively related, then increases in bill 
sponsorship will increase roll call participation.  That is, legislators who participate at high levels 
will participate at high levels across activities.  This would be the case, for example, if legislators 
who frequently sponsor legislation are better versed in public policy, and have already overcome 
the informational costs of taking a policy position on a bill.  On the other hand, if sponsorship 
and roll call absenteeism are positively related, this suggests that legislators, perhaps because 
they are faced with an increasing workload, are making trade-offs between legislative activities. 
Although both lines of reasoning are compelling, I expect that legislators will make trade offs 
with their time; bill sponsorship should have a positive relationship with roll call absenteeism.  
5.2.2 Political Party  
The partisanship of a legislator has been shown to be a strong predictor of vote choice 
(see Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Aldrich 1995).  However, when it comes to influences on 
participation, the results are mixed.  Rothenberg and Sanders also find mixed effects on the 
differences in abstention behavior across partisan lines.  They find that Republicans are more 
 72 
  
likely to abstain then Democrats, although the effect is relatively small in magnitude when 
compared to other contextual variables. When a bill is sponsored, it can be seen as a proposal to 
create new public policy—and therefore an argument can be made that Republicans, who 
traditionally espouse limited government, may sponsor fewer bills.  In the case of roll call voting, 
however, the choice to cast a vote (regardless of whether it supports or opposes a policy) does 
not represent a choice to create new public policy.  There is therefore no clear theoretical basis 
for the expectation that Republicans (or Democrats) will be more likely to shirk.  Although 
partisanship is a necessary control variable, as norms may differ across party caucuses, I have no 
expectations regarding the direction of the effect of partisanship on absenteeism.  
5.2.3 Majority Party 
The effect of majority party status can be considered in terms of numbers and incentives.  
On one hand, members of the majority may be more likely to cast a floor vote because it is 
relatively likely that any measure that has been reported out of committee to the floor has 
majority party support. This gives majority party members more incentive to sponsor legislation; 
recall that in Chapter 4, I found a significant and positive relationship between sponsorship and 
majority party affiliation.  Majority party status may similarly encourage roll call participation..  
On the other hand, members of the minority party need all the votes they can muster to pass their 
legislation—or, more commonly, stop legislation proposed by the majority party.  I therefore 
expect that minority party members will have higher levels of roll call attendance than majority 
party members.   
5.2.4 Seniority, Freshman, and Retirement 
Hibbing (1991) finds that member seniority has a strong influence on roll call voting 
behavior.  In terms of the roll call voting career, Hibbing notes that members have a general 
tendency to be “less supportive of their party” and are “likely to participate in roll call votes” 
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(106).  He notes that “the decline in participation over the course of a career is not particularly 
earth-shattering” (106).  In keeping with Hibbing (1991), I hypothesize that as seniority 
increases, levels of absenteeism will increase.   
Recall that in Chapter 4, I argued that newer legislators would sponsor fewer measures, 
because of prohibitive informational costs.  However, despite the informational costs associated 
with roll-call voting, it is likely that newer members will have higher participation rates. First 
year representatives have a strong incentive to establish a record of voting on the existing 
legislative agenda, in order to show a commitment to the party and constituency.  Sinclair (1995) 
reports that in nominating speeches for exclusive committees the nominee’s party loyalty is 
praised by the leadership.  Leadership endorsement is important (Shepsle 1978) and legislators 
who vote more often with leaders have a high probability of being transferred to a preferred 
committee.  More senior members may be less concerned with impressing the leadership or 
sitting on a preferred committee, in part because their reputations have already been established.  
I expect that junior members will have higher levels of roll-call participation than senior 
members. 
Poole and Rosenthal (1997) also note that “other costs may arise for legislators who 
know they will not be present in the next Congress.  Some of those who will not return for the 
next Congress may be abstaining because they have decided to retire or pursue another career or 
higher office.  These legislators, particularly those leaving politics, find voting relatively costly, 
as they not longer have the incentive to present their electorate with a good attendance record 
(213).  However, they go on to note that “the causality may run the other way” (213), in that a 
poor voting record may result in an involuntary exit due to electoral defeat.  Further, Rothenberg 
and Sanders (2000) find that legislators who are in their last term have lower levels of 
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participation than their counterparts.   For these reasons, I expect that members in their last year 
of legislative service will have higher levels of absenteeism.   
5.2.5 Previous Elective Experience and Freshman/Experience Interaction 
I expect that legislators with previous elective experience will be more effective at 
managing their scarce legislative time. Furthermore, and likely most important, these legislators 
may have a better understanding of a broad range of policy issues, and will therefore incur lower 
informational costs when casting roll call votes.  Because of their political experience, they are 
relatively likely to have considered and formulated an opinion on a wider range of political 
issues.  I expect that legislators with previous experience will be less likely to miss votes.   To 
further test the impact of previous elective experience on legislative absenteeism, I also include 
an interaction term that measures the conditioning effect of previous elective experience only on 
first year legislators.  If previous elective experience actually does decrease the informational 
costs of taking policy positions, this effect should be especially pronounced during a legislator’s 
first term.  I hypothesize that newly elected legislators with previous elective experience will 
miss fewer roll call votes than the less experienced legislators in their cohort. 
5.2.6 Party Leadership and Committee Chairs 
According to Strattman (2000), freshman members look toward party leaders for voting 
cues.  This is particularly true because (as Chapter 4 showed), committee chairs often take the 
lead in placing policy proposals on the legislative agenda.  It is necessary for party and 
committee leaders to cast a vote to provide the necessary guidance for the membership. I 
therefore expect that committee chairs and legislative leaders will have lower levels of 






The previous work on legislative abstention does not address the role of gender.  
However, other research (see Thomas 1991, Bratton and Haynie 1999, Barnello and Bratton 
2007) has found that women have different patterns of bill sponsorship than their male 
counterparts.  In addition, women may have a higher incentive than men to have a near perfect 
participation record, since their behavior in office may receive (or may be perceived to receive) 
closer scrutiny.   I therefore hypothesize that female legislators will have lower levels of 
absenteeism than their male counterparts.   
5.2.8 Voting Extremism and Ideology 
Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Rothenberg and Sanders (2000) both discuss the role of 
alienation, indifference, and abstention.  Drawing on Poole and Rosenthal’s original theory of 
abstention, they argue that turnout should be inversely related to the degree of indifference.  
Ideological alienation leads to lower participation levels.  Unlike sponsorship—which gives 
ideological extremists one of their only opportunities to place their policy concerns and 
preferences on the political agenda—roll call voting involves an up-down vote on a measure that 
has already been vetted by committees. Scholarship on state legislative committees indicates that 
committees are generally representative of the chamber as a whole, suggesting that measures 
reported out to the floor are likely not close to the ideal points of ideological extremists. (Overby 
Kazee, and Prince 2004). 
There is no theoretical basis for an expectation regarding the effect of legislator ideology 
(that is, how conservative or liberal a legislator is) and roll call participation.  Like party, 
ideology may influence the decision to sponsor bills, but is less likely to influence the decision of 
to cast a vote (whether in support or opposition) of an existing policy proposal.  I therefore have 
no expectation regarding the relationship between legislator liberalism and roll call participation. 
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5.2.9 Previous Electoral Margin 
Legislators who are not electorally secure (that is, those who won their seat by a 
relatively small margin) may find it more advantageous to spend their time electioneering or 
providing service back in their districts rather than staying at the capital to vote.  Members who 
are electorally secure can spend less time on electioneering activities, thus focusing on other 
legislative activities (i.e. roll call voting). Members with fewer electoral worries are the ones 
who have time to consider each piece of legislation, whereas members with electoral worries do 
not.  I hypothesize that as previous margin of victory increases, legislators will be less likely to 
be absent from roll call votes.   
5.2.10 Professionalism 
Squire (2007) notes “increasing pay has an additional, more subtle, consequence for 
legislators in that it allows them to focus their energies exclusively on their legislative activities 
rather than having to juggle them with the demands of their regular occupations” (214).  Early 
proponents of state legislative reform hoped that increasing institutional resources would 
increase policy making capabilities and increase the collective responsiveness of the state 
legislatures (Rosenthal 1996; Squire 1992).  Supporters of legislative reform have suggested the 
increase in professionalism will attract higher quality representatives, who view their service in 
the state legislature as a long term career.   
Furthermore, the increase of staff (a component of the professionalism measure) may 
lead to better informed legislators, decreasing the cost of acquiring information about policy 
proposals.   Squire (2007) notes that better informed members have greater influence over the 
policy making process, thus feeling as if their contributions make a difference; that is, the act of 
participation is more beneficial to legislators.  Recall from Chapter 4 that sponsorship was 
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positively and significantly related to the professionalism of the chamber.  I therefore expect that 
legislators from professionalized states are more likely to participate on roll call votes.   
5.2.11 Term Limits 
Work by Wright (2007) examines the influence of term limits on individual legislative 
behavior.  He finds that legislators who are being termed out are surprisingly more likely to 
participate, but that this effect is primarily restricted to non-professionalized legislatures.  In this 
research, I control for whether a state legislature is term limited, as well as whether legislators 
are not running for office in the next election (whether through voluntary retirement or through 
being term limited).  In keeping with the expectation that impending retirement  would be 
negatively related with participation, I expect participation levels to be lower in term limited than 
in non-term limited states. 
5.2.12 Public Opinion Liberalism 
As previously argued, states with a more liberal citizenry may prefer a more activist and 
professionalized government.  These citizens may expect that legislators actively represent them 
in government by voting on each piece of legislation.  Therefore, I hypothesize that as public 
opinion liberalism increases, the level of absenteeism will decrease.   
5.2.13 Distance 
Both Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Rothenberg and Sanders (2000) find a relationship 
between abstention and the geographic distance to Washington, DC.  Recall that in Chapter 4, 
distance was negatively correlated with sponsorship levels; it may have an even stronger 
influence on roll-call voting, since roll call voting takes place at fixed times which may be 
scheduled with only short notice and are largely out of the legislator's control.  In keeping with 
this finding, I expect a similar relationship between roll call participation and distance from 
home district to state capital.  
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5.2.14 Social Diversity  
No previous research has directly analyzed the relationship between social diversity and 
absenteeism.  However, the conclusion of Hogan, Kromer, Wrzenski (2006) does provide 
theoretical support for potential effect of social diversity on roll call participation.  If legislators 
are sponsoring more legislation in heterogeneous districts to respond to a diverse set of 
constituency demands, it is possible that legislators are less likely to miss roll call votes because 
of the diversity of interests within the district.  For example, if the majority of the constituents in 
a district all work at manufacturing industries, voters or interest groups may not notice if a 
legislator misses a vote on the topic of corporate tax policy or agriculture subsidies.  On the other 
hand, if the occupations in the district are more diverse, legislators will be under more pressure 
to show up to vote.  The central argument here is that increased diversity results in increased 
demands and expectations from the constituency.  Furthermore, legislators from diverse districts 
will be obliged to learn more about a diverse set of issues, thus further providing an incentive to 
cast floor votes.  For these reasons, I expect that as social diversity increases, roll call 
absenteeism will decrease.   
5.3 Model and Results 
What are the determinants of roll absenteeism?  What is the relationship between 
participation through legislative sponsorship and absenteeism? In order to empirically answer 
this question, an ordinary least squares analysis using the percentage of bills in which the 
legislator did not cast a “yea” or “nay” vote on is employed to determine the influence of the 
independent variables described earlier.  Table 13 provides the results from three different 
models (a random, fixed, and mixed effects model) used to predict the determinants of 
absenteeism.  As in the sponsorship analysis, the mixed effects model includes the same 
individual, institutional, and state level variables as the random effects model, with the addition 
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of six dummy variables to control for state-level effects.  The fixed effects model includes all of 
the variables as the fixed effects model, but excludes any state level controls (i.e. term limits, 
professionalism, and citizen ideology). The random effects models include the three state-level 
variables, but does not use state dummy variables to estimate state effects beyond that.  All 
absenteeism models include the sponsorship variable as an independent variable.  Consistent 
with the discussion in Chapter 4, I will focus on the results of the fixed and mixed effects 
models, which are of course identical. 
Only five of the independent variables were found to have a statistically significant effect 
on bill sponsorship, and the independent variables predict about 22% of the variance in 
absenteeism.  It appears that we can explain sponsorship better than we can explain roll call 
voting.  This is perhaps not surprising, since the decision to case a vote on an existing piece of 
legislation may be less systematic than the decision to place legislative proposals on the policy 
agenda.  That said, it should be noted that since sponsorship is included in this model, then all 
the variables that influence sponsorship also indirectly influence the likelihood that a legislator 
will cast a floor vote on a bill. 
What is the relationship between participation and shirking?  The results show that 
sponsorship has a negative and significant effect on roll call absenteeism.  In other words, 
legislators who are active in sponsorship are active in roll call voting.  It may be that legislators 
who frequently sponsor legislation are more knowledgeable on public policy, thus have already 
overcome the informational costs associated with forming a policy opinion. And, there are more 
policy proposals in which they have made a direct investment.  This result lends support to the 
idea that some legislators are simply “work horses” and do not make trade-offs in terms of their 





Table 13: OLS Regression: Effects of Legislator, Institutional, and State Factors on Absenteeism 






Variables Estimate Std. Err Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. 
Participation       
Sponsorship Activity -.08* .03 -.08* .03 -.03 .03 
Individual Level       
Seniority .31** .09 .31** .09 .28** .09 
Freshman -.71 .78 -.71 .78 1.49+ .78 
Retirement 1.14 .76 1.14 .76 1.56+ .79 
Leadership Position 3.34 4.10 3.34 4.10 3.02 4.23 
Committee Chair .04 .69 .04 .69 .01 .67 
Previous Experience -.13 .66 -.13 .66 .08 .67 
Previous Experience, for 
Freshman Legislators 
.11 .93 .11 .93 1.39 .99 
Gender -.66 .55 -.66 .55 -.84 .56 
Party -.07 1.41 -.07 1.41 .25 1.45 
Majority Party -.87 .65 -.87 .65 -1.14+ .65 
Ideology 
(W-Nominate) 
-.82 1.05 -.82 1.05 -1.19 1.08 
Ideological Extremity -2.57* 1.30 -2.57* 1.30 .71 1.35 
Previous Electoral Margin 1.50 1.71 1.50 1.71 .57 1.64 
Distance .06 .37 .06 .37 .39 .29 
Social Diversity  -11.68 8.73 -11.68 8.73 1.01 7.62 
State Level       
Legislative 
Professionalisma 
<.01 .04   -.23** .03 
Citizen Ideology -.18** .05   .09 .04 
Term Limits 5.59** .97   .06 .86 
State Dummies       
Arkansas   8.86** 1.47   
California   7.64** 1.66   
Colorado -10.37** 1.49 .35 1.15   
Florida -6.15** .81 2.73+ 1.51   
Illinois .09 1.18 1.77 1.57   
Maryland       
Michigan -2.92* 1.28 4.44** 1.48   
North Carolina 1.50 1.28 5.30** 1.80   
New Mexico 9.99** 1.76 12.45** 1.72   
Texas   4.61** 1.39   
Constant 19.58
** 3.98 7.17* 3.56 8.19 3.40 
R
2
 .22  .22  .16  
Number of Legislators 885  885  885  
a:   Squire index is transformed so that higher values=more professional 
*:   p≤.05, two-tailed test **:   p≤.05, two-tailed test 




Two individual level variables (seniority and ideological extremism) reached statistical 
significance.  Consistent with theories developed by Hibbing (1991), I find that more senior 
members are less likely to participate in roll call voting. It may be that senior legislators have 
gained so much name recognition and good standing with their constituencies that their 
reputations will not be diminished by low participation (or, for that matter, enhanced by high 
participation) on roll call bills.  These members may not need to use roll call votes as a form of 
coalition building, thus they can easily shirk on their voting duties without fear of repercussion 
from even within the chamber.   Contrary to Rothenberg and Sanders (2002) and Poole and 
Rosenthal (1997), I find that members who are ideologically extreme are miss fewer votes than 
those who are ideologically moderate.  There extreme views may make these legislators more 
likely to form an opinion on each and every vote, thus participating more often than those with 
more moderate opinions.   
In the random effects model (but not in the fixed effects model), professionalism is 
positively related to roll call participation (that is, negatively related to absenteeism). When 
conducting the same sex of thirty five auxiliary regressions, swapping out different sets of state 
dummies, it is clear that in a substantial majority of cases, term limits is as expected positively 
and significantly related to participation—that is, negatively related to absenteeism.  The 
magnitude of the positive effect, however, does depend in part on which states are under 
consideration  In these auxiliary regressions, the liberalism of the state's population is, as 
expected, usually (but not always) positively associated with participation (and negatively 
associated with absenteeism).  The direction of the effect of citizen liberalism is not as consistent 
as the direction of the effect of professionalism.  Finally, term limits is as expected most often 
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negatively associated with participation (and positively associated with absenteeism), although 
again the results depend in part on the states included when estimating the effect.14 
5.4 Discussion 
Perhaps most important, the results indicate that legislators who participate at high levels 
do so across activities.  It may be that the trade-offs are being made elsewhere, potentially 
between activities inside and activities outside the legislative chamber.  That is, it is efficient for 
legislators with a high degree of commitment and policy expertise, as well as an electoral 
incentive to participate, to participate in multiple activities. Surprisingly, however, distance from 
the capital was not significantly related to levels of participation in floor votes.  In general, few 
of the measures that I expected would influence absenteeism – such as distance, career-related 
factors, or minority party status – have a significant effect.  However, some of these factors do 
have an indirect effect on participation through sponsorship.  Legislators who sponsor more 
measures also are more likely to vote on legislative measures, and therefore factors that influence 
sponsorship activity indirectly influence roll-call voting.  First-year representatives, for example, 
sponsor fewer measures and therefore have somewhat lower rates of voting on floor measures; 
committee chairs sponsor more measures, and this indirectly increases their floor voting rates.  
Those who live further from the capital sponsor fewer measures—and this indirectly dampens 
their participation in floor voting.    Conservatives and minority party members introduce fewer 
bills, and this also indirectly reduces floor voting.  It should be noted that these indirect effects 
are quite small and sometimes (as in the case of first-year representatives) in a non-intuitive 
direction.  Nonetheless, the relationship between the two forms of participation under 
consideration here has implications for the determinants of roll-call voting participation. 
                                                           
14 VIF scores for some of the variables, such as majority party affiliation, partisanship, and ideology, were relatively 
high, but auxiliary analyses indicate that collinearity did not appear to influence significance.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONSEQUENCES OF PARTICIPATION 
 
Thus far, this research has centered on the determinants of participatory behavior. The 
results presented in earlier chapters indicate that partisanship and ideology influence 
participation.  Legislators who are liberal or who are affiliated with the majority party sponsor 
more measures; legislators whose ideologies are relatively far from the chamber median (very 
conservative and very liberal legislators) are more likely to participate in floor voting.  Distance 
and leadership position affect sponsorship behavior.  Legislators who serve as committee chairs 
are more active in sponsorship.  Those who live far from the capital sponsor fewer measures than 
their more senior and more locally situated colleagues.   Sponsorship levels and participation in 
roll call voting are both also relatively high in professionalized states—and, somewhat 
surprisingly, tend to be lower in states with a relatively liberal citizenry.  I also found that 
sponsorship was positively related to participation in floor voting—legislators who sponsor more 
measures are also more likely to cast a yea or nay vote on legislation on the floor. 
I have previously argued that the decision to participate can be effectively modeled using 
a rational choice approach, in that legislators are rational actors who make decisions on what 
legislative activity to pursue (or not to pursue) based on the perceived costs and benefits. While 
the benefits to legislative participation can include salary, power, civic duty, and enacting good 
public policy, the costs of behavior can be most clearly identified as the potential to lose an 
upcoming election. As Fenno (1978) observes, many legislators feel insecure, regardless of the 
empirical reality.  In Jacobson and Kernell (1983), Representative Guy Vander Jaft (previously 
the head of the National Republican Congressional Committee) notes that “Just as they say 
pitching is 80 percent of baseball, in a Congressional race the candidate is 80 percent of winning. 
A good candidate can win it, no matter how bad the conditions, and a bad candidate can lose it, 
no matter how good the conditions” (99).  Although the odds are strongly in their favor, 
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incumbents never feel completely insulated from the possibility of being unseated in the next 
election.  
What is the significance of legislative participation on electoral risk? Given the centrality 
of the electoral connection on legislative behavior, this chapter seeks to create a model of 
consequence for legislator’s participatory behavior.  Legislators who believe that they are 
insecure may respond by focusing on electioneering outside of the chamber, and spend less time 
on tasks within the chamber such as sponsorship and roll-call voting.  Indeed, the random effects 
analyzes of sponsorship that were presented in Chapter 4 suggest that individuals who are 
electorally safe sponsor significantly more measures.  But is this response well-justified—do 
legislators pay a price for low participation?  The previous chapters have outlined potential 
individual, institutional, and state/district level determinants of legislative participation and this 
chapter will analyze how these factors, along with the indicators of legislative participation affect 
the potential consequences of the likelihood of a challenge to the incumbent’s seat.  What, if any, 
are the costs of poor legislative participation?  Are incumbents who sponsor relatively few 
measures or who shirk on roll call voting targeted by challengers?  Are these members viewed as 
weaker political opponents?   
This chapter will use challenger emergence as a measure of electoral accountability.  This 
indicator was chosen because of the nature of constituency awareness and candidate recruitment 
in the American states.  In a seven-state survey of 2,112 constituents, Squire (1993) finds that 
most constituents are both ill informed and not interested in the business of their state legislature. 
In general, Squire (1993) finds that most citizens give their state legislature a “passable” rating. 
This general disinterest and lack of awareness suggests that the consequences of legislative 
activity are likely shaped by political elites, most obviously through the recruitment of 
challengers by party elites in that state.  Since party elites are likely aware of the participatory 
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behavior (or lack thereof) of incumbents, and since the mass public is likely less aware of any 
such lack of participation, then any potential effect of participation would be found in the 
likelihood of drawing a challenger, rather than in the electoral margin. Party elites and 
challengers alike may view legislators who do not place many policy proposals on the legislative 
agenda, and who have low attendance rates for floor voting, as relatively vulnerable.  Moreover, 
poor participatory records can be advertised as a failure to represent the constituency. Therefore, 
I expect that legislators who are relatively active in sponsorship and roll-call voting will be more 
likely to run unopposed in their next election. 
This chapter will proceed as follows: First, I will provide a review of the relevant 
literature.  Second, I will develop a set of hypotheses based on the previous literature and the 
previous chapters.  Next, I will develop a model of consequences for legislative behavior based 
on challenger emergence.  I will end this chapter with a discussion of the results and concluding 
remarks on their contribution to the literature.  
6.1 Previous Research on Incumbency Advantage and Challenger Emergence 
Previous research has shown that incumbents are more likely to win in state legislative 
elections than challengers (Breaux 1990, Garand 1991, Jewell and Breaux 1988, King 1991).  
This incumbency advantage is often thought to come from the resources of office and other 
external forces such as the state of the economy and presidential approval rating. Jewell and 
Breaux (1988) found an incumbency advantage, but one that did not increase over time.  Garand 
(1991) likewise found a positive relationship between incumbency and vote share in the general 
election. Other research consistently suggests that incumbent members have a significant 
advantage in fundraising (Cassie and Breaux 1998; Herrnson 2000).  Current and previous 
research indicates a strong incumbency advantage at both the national and state levels. However, 
not every incumbent shares equally in the electoral fortunes that are brought about by tenure in 
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office. Previous research indicates that the incumbency advantage is conditioned by a variety of 
individual, institutional, and state level factors.   
Squire (2000) makes two important observations in terms of incumbency advantage in 
the American state legislatures.  First, a substantial number (about thirty five percent) of seats in 
the state legislatures are uncontested in each election cycle; state legislators are much more likely 
than members of Congress to run unopposed for re-election. Second, there is substantial 
variation across states and within states in the likelihood of running unopposed.15.  Why is it that 
some incumbents in a given state are seldom challenged, while others are challenged quite 
frequently? This research will draw on previous work in this area to examine challenger 
emergence, and will add to the extant literature by focusing on the relationship between 
legislative activity (through sponsorship and roll-call voting) and the likelihood of drawing a 
challenger.   
What type of legislator is relatively likely to draw a challenger?  Pritchard (1992) finds 
that incumbents who appear to be vulnerable, based on previous vote margin, are not surprisingly 
more likely to be challenged in the general election.  However, the data used in the study 
(Florida House of Representatives between 1972-80) limits the ability to draw a general 
conclusion about challenger emergence. Van Dunk (1997) finds that “quality challengers run 
against incumbents who have shown previous electoral vulnerability and quality challengers are 
more likely to be successful when they do run” (794).  Van Dunk (1997) also finds that older 
state legislators are more likely to draw a challenge than younger state legislators.   
Hogan (2004) considers legislative accountability from three different perspectives: 
likelihood of a challenger emerging, the strength of the challenger's campaign, and the 
                                                           
15 Squire (2000) analyzes elections from all 50 states from 1988 to 1996.  Squire (2000) uses the 1996 as an example 
of the variation between states and notes that two-thirds of the seats in the Arkansas House were uncontested, while 
no seats in the Massachusetts House were uncontested.   
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percentage of the general election vote received.  The data used in the analysis include all 
legislators from upper and lower chamber elections in fourteen states in 1996 and 1998.16  
Controlling for a variety of institutional, district, and individual level factors,17including the 
degree to which the incumbents voting record reflected the preferences of the constituency, 
Hogan finds that district and institutional level factors are strong determinants of changer 
emergence and strength.  Hogan does not examine the effect of levels of legislative activity in 
general on challenger emergence.  Furthermore, Hogan (2004) does not control for the impact of 
gender on challenger emergence.  This research contributes to earlier research by examining the 
relationship between legislative activity and challenger emergence. 
6.2 Variables and Hypotheses 
The dependent variable in the analysis of challenger emergence is a dichotomous 
indicator measuring whether or not the incumbent is challenged in the general election by a 
majority party candidate (coded 1 if the incumbent was challenged by a majority party candidate 
and 0 otherwise).   
In terms of the consequences of participatory behavior, I test the following hypotheses:  
H1: Legislators with high levels of roll call abstention will draw more challengers than  
      legislators with high levels of attendance on roll call bills.  
 
H2: Legislators with active sponsorship records will draw fewer challengers than  
      legislators with inactive sponsorship records.  
 
To reiterate, it is likely that partisan elites and potential candidates are likely to monitor 
the behavior of incumbents.  Indeed, an observer may become a potential candidate because of 
the behavior of incumbents.  Low levels of sponsorship and roll call voting may signal that a 
                                                           
16 The states include Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Ohio, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. 
17 Hogan (2004) controls for campaign finance restrictions, chamber, chamber competition, party advantage in 
district, district population, percentage rural, majority party, length of service, leadership, committee chairmanship, 
policy divergence, partisanship, and election year.   
 88 
  
legislator is not fully involved in the legislative process; legislators who have low participation 
levels may be perceived as inadequately representing their constituencies. 
The major focus of this chapter is the impact of sponsorship and abstention on the 
reelection prospects of state legislative incumbents. The cost of low levels of participation is 
central to this examination of legislative behavior.  That is, I propose that these two components 
of lawmaking functions (sponsorship and roll call voting) not only vary systematically across 
members, but have an effect on electoral security.  I also seek to build on the earlier findings of 
Hogan (2004), Van Dunk (1997), and Prichard (1992) on challenger emergence and quality, by 
incorporating a similar set of independent variables that may influence challenger emergence.  
This chapter considers several individual level factors that potentially influence 
challenger emergence.  Like Hogan (2004), I control for seniority, leadership, committee 
chairmanship, partisanship, and majority party status. In addition to these variables, I include 
controls for gender, first term, past general election vote, and prior experience.   
6.2.1 Seniority and Freshman Term 
This research uses two variables to control for the effects of seniority on challenger 
emergence and quality; a continuous variable measuring the total years of service in the 
legislature and a dummy variable coded 1 if the legislator is in his/her first legislative term and 0 
otherwise.  As members gain seniority they insulate themselves from electoral defeat with name 
recognition, pork barrel politics, contributions, and institutional knowledge.  Further, time in the 
legislatures could allow legislators to amass a substantial “war chest,” thus “sending a signal to 
challengers that they too will have to raise a similarly large amount of money to be competitive” 
(Hogan 2001, 816).  Breaux (1990) and Holbrook and Tidmarch (1991) both found that there 
was a “sophomore surge” in incumbency advantage and the surge was higher in states with more 
institutional resources.  In general, tenure in office seems to intensify the incumbency advantage 
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in elections. Work by Squire (1989) and Prichard (1992) suggest that junior state legislators are 
less entrenched and therefore more vulnerable; in fact, Prichard (1992) finds that incumbent 
tenure is negatively related to the probability if challenger emergence.  Most convincing, Van 
Dunk (1997) finds that tenure in office has a negative relationship with challenger emergence, 
even when controlling for the age of the legislator.  Finally, Hogan (2001) finds a small 
relationship between incumbency and challenger emergence.   
I hypothesize that there will be a negative relationship between tenure in office and 
challenger emergence.  Entrenched legislators are formidable opponents and challengers will 
find it difficult to muster both the funds and the political skills to defeat them.  On the other 
hand, I hypothesize that freshman members will face more challenges.  First-term legislators 
haven’t had the time to amass large campaign war chests or even name recognition, and thus will 
be considered more politically vulnerable.  
6.2.2 Previous Elective Experience and Experience/Freshman Interaction 
Van Dunk (1997) and Jacobson (1989) conceptualizes “quality challenger” as a 
challenger that has previously served in public office.  Candidates with previous elected 
experience have developed the skills for campaigning, policy expertise, and the name recognition 
that makes their run for state legislative office more effective.  These skills are most likely 
enhanced overtime, making incumbents with other experience in public office especially 
invulnerable. Furthermore, legislators with previous elective experience are more likely to 
understand the electoral process and do a better job of insulating themselves (perhaps, but 
effectively participating in legislative activities or focusing on the legislative actives that matter 
the most to their electorate).   I hypothesize that legislators with previous experience will draw 
fewer challengers than legislators who are new to political office..  This analysis also includes an 
interaction term that measures the effect that previous elective experience has on freshman 
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legislators.  If previous electoral experience does, indeed, make legislators less likely to draw a 
challenger (by both appearing stronger and actually being stronger) then this effect should be 
especially pronounced among first-year legislators.  That is, I expect that first-year legislators are 
more likely to draw challengers, but that this is less true for first-year legislators who have 
political experience. 
6.2.3 Party Leadership, Committee Chairs, and Majority Party Affiliation 
Party and committee leadership are typically responsible for the institutional organization 
of the legislative body.  According to Rosenthal (1981), legislators in leadership positions “bear 
great responsibility and exert more than nominal influence” (162).  Morehouse (1980) notes that 
“majority party leadership in each legislature makes the crucial decisions about party 
membership on committees, the party ratio appointment of chairmen, the rules and settling the 
chamber down to its job” (280).  These leadership controlled benefits can provide individual 
legislators with an electoral advantage over rank-and-file members. Holbrook and Tidmarch 
(1993) test the effect of leadership and committee chairmanship on electoral margin of victory.  
They find that “party leaders and committee chairs have a higher margin of victory than other 
incumbents in their state” and “the effects of leadership positions and chairing a committee are 
significant primarily just for members of the majority party” (906). Finally, research by Dwyer 
and Stonecash (1992) find that it is the party leadership that raises and makes decisions on the 
allocations of funds to members of their party.  It should be noted, however, that those in 
leadership positions are relatively visible, and may therefore be more likely to draw a 
challenger—even if their eventual margin of victory is likely to be substantial.   
However, given the overall findings of previous literature, I expect that legislative leaders 
and committee chairs, and those in the majority party, will be less likely to face electoral 
challenges.  Legislators who are either party leaders or committee chairs should be relatively 
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able to satisfy the interests and preferences of their constituencies, through control of the 
legislative agenda. While their visibility may be a two-edged sword, they should have substantial 
influence over the shape and tone of media coverage.  And, perhaps most important, their 
influence over the redistricting process likely gives them a comfortable, safe electoral 
environment, therefore discouraging challengers.  
6.2.4 Gender 
Although there has been a substantial amount of research done on the policy preferences, 
ideology, and general impact of female legislator when they gain elected office, little is know 
how the characteristic of being female affects the retention of that office.  Previous research by 
Dolan (1997) finds that the roles of female legislators have changed overtime.  She finds that 
although women are not abandoning their service on committees dealing with women’s issue 
legislation, they are now more likely than before to serve on committees dealing with financial 
and business concerns.  Furthermore, female state legislators are more likely to hold a leadership 
or committee chair position now than they were previously.  Her general conclusion is that 
women serving in state legislatures are “younger, better educated, come to the legislature from 
more professional occupations” than women from previous decades (147).  Dolan (1998) 
analyzes the determinants of constituency support for female candidates during the “Year of the 
Woman18.” She finds that women are more likely than men to support a female candidate.  She 
concludes that female candidates are still viewed as outsiders and support for female candidates 
may be in part for a desire to change “business as usual” or because of an increased concern for 
domestic and social issues.  However, in her 2004 book “Voting for Women: How the Public 
Evaluates Women Candidates,” Dolan notes that “the candidate’s sex and the gendered 
considerations it raises, has a more complex and nuanced impact on voters then we may have 
                                                           
18 1992 is often called the “Year of the Woman” because of the historic legislative gains (in terms of total seat count) 
in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.   
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imagined” (154).  She finds no consistent pattern explaining the impact on candidate sex on 
congressional or senatorial races and that incumbency and partisanship remain the primary 
predictors of constituency voting behavior.   
What does this mean for the electoral security of female legislators?  Does their gender 
insulate them from challengers?  Or, does characteristic of being female make them a magnet for 
opposition?  One of the most interesting findings of Dolan (2004) is that “people were more 
likely to have more information about women candidates, both Democrat and Republican, than 
about men of either party” (155).  In other words, voters pay closer attention to female 
candidates and in politics attention often equates to scrutiny. If female legislators are now 
achieving these positions of legislative leadership and increasing their tenure in office, do they 
equally reap the aforementioned benefits?  Further, if the typical female state legislator is 
arguably more “qualified” to serve, are they viewed as a fierce political adversary thus scaring 
off potential challengers?  According to Atkeson (2003), women have a greater likelihood of 
political engagement when a competitive female candidate is present.  If women have a core 
constituency of women, does this lead to a decreased likelihood of being challenged?  Or does 
the perception of women as more vulnerable lead to an increased likelihood of being challenged?  
Research consistently indicated that women are just as successful at winning office as their 
similarly situated male candidates (Fox and Oxley 2003; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997).  
However, it may be that women are perceived as more vulnerable, therefore leading to the 
emergence of challengers.  I therefore expect that female legislators will be viewed as more 
vulnerable than male legislators in similar political situations.  Decisions on candidate 
recruitment are often made by the party elite, not by the constituency at large. Work by 
Sanbonmatsu (2002) indicates that women’s political recruitment is more limited where party 
organizations exert a great deal of influence over the recruitment process, suggesting the party 
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officials may see men as enjoying electoral advantages—and women as being easier to defeat.. 
For these reasons, I hypothesize that female legislators will be more likely to draw challengers 
than their male counterparts.   
6.2.5 Partisanship 
Although partisanship is one the primary and most consistent predictors of reelection, in 
context of this research question partisanship is used as a control variable.  In congressional 
studies, previous research has shown that members of Congress are often punished or rewarded 
for the electoral fortunes of the president.  The time period in this research does not overlap with 
the election of a state or national executive, and therefore coattails should not be a major issue of 
concern.  Moreover, research indicates that an individual's partisanship (an presumably the 
partisanship of a single legislator) does not influence public approval; a study done by Patterson, 
Ripley, and Quinlan (1992) found that citizen partisanship had no effect on the evaluation of the 
Ohio State Legislature (as a legislative body).  They did find that Ohio citizens identifying 
themselves as Democrats did evaluate the Democratic Congress more favorably than their 
Republican counterparts.  Therefore, in states and districts where Democrats are a majority, it is 
likely that Republicans will draw more challengers, and in states and districts where Republicans 
are a majority, it is likely that Democrats will draw more challengers.  However, the variables for 
previous electoral margin will in control for any such pattern, as one's margin of victory reflects 
a base of support in the district.   I do include partisanship as a control variable, because the 
norms and resources of parties may vary across states and across districts, but I do not have a 






6.2.6 Previous Electoral Margin 
Legislators who have a previous and consistent record of victory are not desirable 
opponents. A large margin of victory, particularly one earned in the last election, is a clear 
indicator of strength, and a small margin of victory is a clear indicator of vulnerability. 
Consistent with the findings of Prichard (1992), I hypothesize that legislators with a higher 
margin of victory in the previous electoral cycle will be less likely to draw a challenger.   
6.2.7 Social Diversity and Distance from Capital 
Legislators from heterogeneous districts face more constituency demands than members 
from homogeneous districts.  With each decision they make, legislators from districts with high 
levels of social diversity risk the possibility of alienating one part of their constituency.  While 
legislators from heterogeneous districts have likely developed the policy and communication 
skills to successfully address the various and competing policy demands of their districts, it is 
likely that incumbents from relatively diverse districts remain relatively electorally vulnerable.  I 
likewise expect that incumbents whose districts are far from the capital will be more likely to 
draw a challenger than those who live near the capital. 
6.2.8 Professionalism 
The effect of professionalism on challenger emergence and quality creates an interesting 
paradox to consider. On one hand, work by Jewell and Breaux (1988) note that the trend of 
larger margins in state legislative races are not found in open seat races.  This trend suggests the 
increasing margins are largely explained by the growing advantages enjoyed by incumbents 
rather than an increase in electorally safe districts (512). Further, Cox and Morgenstern (1993) 
conclude that the growth of the incumbency advantage at the state level is positively related to 
the growth in state legislative operating budgets and resources.  In general, Cox and Morgenstern 
find additional support to the theory that professionalism further insulates incumbents.  One 
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could justify that the insulation of incumbents in professionalized legislatures could as a 
deterrent to potential challengers. Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman (2000) find just that; 
legislators in professionalized legislatures have more resources to insulate them from electoral 
competition.   
However, does the attractiveness of the professionalized legislative seat override these 
institutional insulations?  Squire (2000) finds that more professionalized legislatures draw more 
challengers than less professionalized legislatures. Increases in staff and salary make service in 
the legislature far more attractive.  As the perks of the job increase, and as the job becomes a 
full-time career option, the likelihood that potential candidates are willing to pay the cost of 
running a campaign may also increase. Professionalized legislatures may also attract a specific 
type of challenger. Berkman (1988) and Maestas (2003) note that a by-product of 
professionalism is the increased number of progressively ambitious legislators who are now 
attracted to state legislative service.  Politicians, who are planning a relatively long political 
career that extends beyond the state legislature to the halls of the U.S. Congress, may view 
service in a state legislature as a stepping stone to higher office. They are potentially faced with a 
different set of opportunities and risks than potential candidates for less professionalized 
legislatures (Berkman 1994; Squire 1988, 1988a).  Since holding office is a necessary step—but 
just one step—to a long-term goal, these individuals may be more likely to challenge a sitting 
incumbent in the state legislature, with an eye toward (at worst) increasing their electoral 
experience and (at best) gaining state legislative office which can be eventually used as a 
springboard to a higher position.  Most recently, Hogan (2004) finds that professionalism has a 
significant positive effect on challenger emergence, lending further support that seats in 
professionalized legislatures are quite enticing.   
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Although unseating an incumbent from a professionalized legislature may be more 
difficult than unseating a legislator from a citizen legislature, the attractiveness of the office and 
the type of challenger the office attracts should outweigh the campaign costs—even if the 
challenger is defeated, there are benefits gained from running.  Given the previous research, I 
expect that legislators from professionalized legislatures will draw more challengers than less 
professionalized legislatures.   
6.2.9 Term Limits 
Do legislators from term limited states draw more challengers than otherwise?  Term 
limits are thought to create opportunity by opening seats.  This opportunity may generate interest 
in running for the legislature, potentially creating an aggregate interest in running for that 
particular legislature.  However, the attractiveness of legislative service in the state legislature 
may decrease if they seat is term limited.  Even those who are particularly politically ambitious 
could be dissuaded from service by the limit on their legislative service.  For example, these 
legislators would prefer to stay in state wide office until a politically advantageous time to run 
for national office arises.  Furthermore, challengers may find it advantageous (both politically 
and financially) to wait the relatively short period of time until the seat becomes open—and the 
while the costs of the race may be higher (because both individuals are likely relatively credible 
candidates), the seat is almost certainly easier to win.  Therefore, I hypothesize that incumbents 
in term limited states will draw fewer challengers.   
6.2.10 Citizen Ideology 
I hypothesize that legislators from states with a more liberal citizenry will be more likely 
to draw challengers than those representing states with a more conservative citizenry.  Citizens 
from these states are likely more supportive of the progressive ideals of reform and changes to 
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the status quo, and therefore these states are likely relatively hospitable environments for would-
be challengers.    
6.3 Model and Results 
This analysis is restricted to those individuals who ran for re-election after 2001.  As 
noted in Chapter 3, about half of these incumbents faced a challenge in upcoming electoral cycle.  
What factors are associated with an electoral challenge?  Specifically, what is the impact of 
participatory behavior within the legislature on challenger emergence?  Table 14 gives the results 
of a logistic regression model in which challenger emergence (coded 1 for challenge, 0 for no 
challenge) is the dependent variable. As in Chapter 4 and 5, I provide the results for a fixed, 
random, and mixed effects model.  
As in Chapters 4 and 5, I will focus this discussion on the results in the fixed effects 
analysis (which are, of course, the same as the results of the analysis which includes both the 
three substantive state-level variables of professionalism, term limits, and citizen ideology, as 
well as six dummy variables to control for state effects).Both the sponsorship and absenteeism 
variables failed to reach any level of significance. Thus, I find no support for my two hypotheses.  
The earlier finings regarding sponsorship activity indicated that legislators who are electorally 
vulnerable have relatively low sponsorship levels.  It appears that any choice to have relatively 
low sponsorship levels (perhaps because time is spent outside of the chamber in electioneering 
activities) does not create an even greater electoral risk.  It is possible, of course, that poor 
participation is punished through different means and in different contexts.  For example, 
legislators who have poor participatory records may not get a seat on their preferred committee 
or earn a leadership position.  Further, legislation proposed by these legislators may be less likely 
to receive a full hearing, or to pass.  All of these possibilities would be fruitful questions to 
address with future research.  
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Table 14: LOGIT Analysis: Effects of Legislator, Institutional, and State Factors on 
Challenger Emergence 






Variables Estimate Std. Err Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. 
Participation       
Sponsorship Activity .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
Roll Call Absenteeism .02 .01 .02 .01 .02+ .01 
Individual Level       
Seniority -.02 .02 -.02 .02 -.03 .02 
Freshman .02 .31 .02 .31 -.20 .29 
Retirement N/A  N/A  N/A  
Leadership Position .61 .73 .61 .73 .64 .76 
Committee Chair .49+ .26 .49+ .26 .37 .24 
Previous Experience -.30 .23 -.30 .23 -.25 .23 
Previous Experience, for 
Freshman Legislators 
-.04 .41 -.04 .41 -.04 .38 
Gender -.40+ .21 -.40+ .21 -.36+ .20 
Party .03 .52 .03 .52 .15 .52 
Majority Party -.21 .24 -.21 .24 -.31 .21 
Ideology 
(W-Nominate) 
-.03 .36 -.03 .36 -.23 .36 
Ideological Extremity .62 .48 .62 .48 .58 .44 
Previous Electoral 
Margin 
-2.59** .56 -2.59** .56 -2.75** .52 
Distance .06 .11 .06 .11 -.27** .08 
Social Diversity  2.41 2.77 2.41 2.77 1.83 2.38 
State Level       
Legislative 
Professionalisma 
.04* .02   .05** .01 
Citizen Ideology .06* .03   .04** .01 
Term Limits -.02 .47   .22 .23 
State Dummies       
Arkansas   -2.06** .71   
California   .09 .87   
Colorado 1.08 .71 -.37 .69   
Florida -1.36** .43 -2.18** .73   
Illinois -.60 .45 -.68 .67   
Maryland       
Michigan 2.70* 1.16 2.70* 1.25   
North Carolina -.14 .34 1.23+ .67   
New Mexico -.16 .65 -1.86** .70   
Texas   1.30+ .69   
Constant -3.48** 1.61 1.84 1.26 -2.16* 1.22 
R2 .21  .21  .15  
Number of Legislators 885  885  885  
a:   Squire index is transformed so that higher values=more professional  




In the current analysis, only four variables had a statistically significant effect on 
challenger emergence.  Like the previous research on this question, I find that legislative 
professionalism has a positive impact on the likelihood of challenger emergence.  In other words, 
legislative elections in states with more professionalized legislatures are more likely to be 
contested.  Although incumbents in professionalized seats have more resources to insulate them 
from electoral defeat, it appears that these resources do not prevent them from being challenged.  
The effect of professionalism is quite large and demonstrates how enticing seats in professional 
legislatures are to potential candidates.  Legislators from states with a more liberal citizenry have 
a greater likelihood of challenger emergence.  This finding is in keeping with my expectations, 
and may be reflective of a more progressive outlook on governance.  In other words, challengers 
may find that the citizenry are more receptive of challenges to the status quo (i.e. the current 
incumbent).   
Consistent with the earlier findings of Prichard (1992) and others, I find that previous 
electoral margin has a negative impact on the likelihood of challenger emergence.  Large 
margins likely deter challengers.  Legislators who are committee chairs have an increased 
likelihood of challenger emergence, which is contrary to my expectations.  It may be possible 
that legislators in leadership positions are more visible and therefore are more likely to attract 
electoral challenges, even if those challenges are quixotic in nature. 
Finally, the most interesting result is the impact of gender on the likelihood of challenger 
emergence.  I hypothesize that, despite evidence that female legislators are just as likely to be 
successful as their similarly situated male counterparts and that in general women holding state 
office are more qualified, female incumbents will be more likely to draw challengers than male 
incumbents because they are likely to be perceived as more vulnerable.  The results show that 
female incumbents have a decreased likelihood of drawing a challenger than their male 
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counterparts.  It should be noted that prior research has indicated that women tend to run when 
the probability of winning is relatively high—that is, they are more risk averse in their electoral 
behavior than are men (Fox and Lawless 2004)  Therefore, it may be that women are more likely 
to represent districts that match well to their interests and ideology, and that they have high 
electoral margins when first elected, and these factors combine to discourage would-be 
challengers.19 
6.4 Discussion 
The results indicate that the participatory behavior of incumbents does not significantly 
influence the likelihood that an incumbent will face an electoral challenge.  There appears to be 
little direct electoral consequence for low participation within the chamber.  Two comments are 
in order.  First, it may be that the actual reasons for low participation is that the legislator is 
devoting more time to electioneering outside the chamber, and that this attenuates any 
relationship between legislative behavior and electoral accountability.  Moreover, it is also 
possible that an electoral consequence of poor participatory behavior would be more visible 
during the primary.  Finally, it is possible that the consequences of legislative participation are 
found in legislative outcomes, not in electoral outcomes.  More research should be done to 
explore these questions. 
                                                           
19 Supplementary regressions of vote margin on the same set of independent variables produced results that are 
substantively similar to the results presented here.  Moreover, the "prior electoral margin" variable does reduce 
much of the available variance, since it taps into much of what constitutes electoral vulnerability.  However, when 




CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
At the beginning of this project, I asked the question “who participates?” Using bill 
sponsorship and roll call participation as indicators of participation, I identified several 
individual, institutional, and state level factors that influence levels of participation.  I found that 
participation in the form of sponsoring an voting on legislation varies across party and 
ideological lines, as well as across career stages and institutional contexts.  Liberal legislators, 
majority party legislators, legislators who have served beyond their first year, and those who are 
in their last term of service sponsor more legislation.  More ideologically extreme legislators and 
more junior legislators vote at higher rates than their more moderate or more senior colleagues.  
Committee chairs sponsor a relatively high number of bills, but do not appear to vote at different 
rates than do their colleagues.  Surprisingly, legislators with previous political experience 
sponsor fewer bills than their less experienced colleagues, perhaps because they can better 
prioritize across potential policies, and focus their energies on bills that will have a marked 
impact on the policy agenda, or shore up electoral support.  Legislators from states with 
professionalized chambers sponsored more bills, and missed fewer votes.  Legislators from 
relatively liberal states sponsored fewer bills, but have higher voting rates.   Perhaps most 
important, legislators who were active in sponsorship were also relatively active in roll call 
voting. 
Some of the results suggest that legislators do make trade-offs, and that these trade-offs 
may occur not so much at any particular point in time, but more so across a legislative career.   In 
their first year, legislators have relatively high attendance rates for roll call voting, but sponsor 
fewer bills than do their more senior colleagues.  As the career progresses, absenteeism on floor 
votes becomes more common, but legislators are more active in placing legislation on the policy 
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agenda. At any one point in time, however, it appears that there is little trade-off between 
sponsorship and roll call voting.    Legislators who sponsor a higher number of bills miss a fewer 
number of floor votes.  It is unlikely that this is due merely to participation in floor votes on bills 
which any one legislator sponsored; the number of floor votes is much higher than the number of 
bills that any one legislator sponsors and brings to the floor.  It appears that legislators who are 
active within the chamber are active in multiple forms of legislative activity.  It may be that any 
trade-off that takes place is one involving a choice between activity within the physical confines 
of the legislature and activity outside of the chamber.  Indeed, the finding that electoral margin 
was positively related to sponsorship suggests that such a trade-off may be taking place—
legislators who are electorally vulnerable may be focusing on constituency service and 
electioneering outside of the chamber, in the interests of pursuing their proximate goal of re-
election, and sacrificing the more long-term benefit of pursuing good public policy.  
Without data on the time spent on constituency service and electioneering activities, such 
conclusions are speculative, but can provide a springboard for future research.  Any such 
relationship would be very compatible with a rational choice model, and very much in keeping 
with Mayhew's argument that legislators are first and foremost concerned with re-election, rather 
than the pursuit of public policy.  Of course, the equivalent conclusion that can be drawn is that 
electorally safe legislators take advantage of the opportunity to pursue public policy—therefore 
suggesting that contrary to Mayhew's relatively narrow conception of the interests of legislators, 
legislators do have public policy goals. 
In what other ways do the findings shed light on the question of whether legislators are 
behaving "rationally"?  In several ways, it appears that legislators are weighing costs and 
benefits.   First year legislators and minority party legislators—for whom introduction likely 
entails relatively high costs and few benefits—are less active in sponsorship.  Junior legislators 
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focus on roll-call voting instead, which likely brings the benefit of solidifying their reputation in 
the chamber   Committee chairs, who likely pay relatively low costs to sponsor legislation, but 
are relatively likely to enjoy the credit-claiming and policy-making benefits of proposed (and 
eventually successful) legislation, sponsor more legislation.  Liberals appear to be relatively 
likely to take the opportunity to shape the policy agenda through sponsorship activity, and 
ideological extremists are relatively likely to take the opportunity to voice their opinion in floor 
voting. Sponsorship and voting activity was relatively high in professionalized legislatures, 
where the opportunity costs and informational costs of sponsoring and casting votes on 
legislation is relatively low.  Indeed, these results suggest that members do assess costs and 
benefits, thus increasing the efficiency of the legislative process.  However, those costs and 
benefits are not always narrowly restricted to re-election benefits. 
I found that it was easier to explain legislative activity than to explain the consequences 
of any lack of legislative activity.  It may be that the consequences of a lack of legislative 
participation are found in the legislative process itself.  Again, even if legislators are interested in 
making good public policy, if their proximate goal is re-election, then it may be that they are 
willing to trade-off legislative activity for electioneering activity—and that such a trade-off does 
not have consequences at the ballot box. 
1.1 Lessons for Future Research 
There are several ways to build on this research project.  The first is that the measure of 
agenda-setting behavior – sponsorship – could be further developed.  Sponsorship is clearly a 
measure of legislative activity, and it is a good measure, given that the agenda-setting stage of 
the legislative process is not only a crucial element of policy-making, but also offers legislators 
an opportunity to express their interests and the interests of their constituencies without being 
constrained to an up-down vote.  However, agenda-setting could also be measured by the policy 
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areas of the bills that are introduced, as well as the ideological tone of the measures.  Measures 
of bills that are truly "new" to the legislative agenda—as opposed to those who refine existing 
policies in relatively narrow way, or which have been introduced before—would be particularly 
valuable.  The saliency of legislation would, and/or the degree of controversy that is involved in 
a particular policy would be useful to know when assessing agenda-setting participation.  
Diversity across legislative proposals sponsored by a legislator could also be a useful measure of 
legislative participation.  Moreover, it would be useful to assess the determinants of the 
sponsorship of successful measures.  In general, this dissertation contributes by recognizing that 
the straightforward level of activity is important to consider—but much, much more could be 
done to assess the factors that influence the set of measures that each legislator places on the 
legislative agenda. 
In the other analyses, a distinction between absenteeism and abstention should be made 
(if possible) in future research, and activity through committee deliberation and voting would be 
useful to incorporate in any overall story about legislative participation.  Most important, much 
more could be done as well to assess the consequences of activity.  It may be the consequences 
exist more for legislation that is actively passed (or, for that matter, actively blocked), and that 
consequences take the form of interest group rewards (or sanctions) and effects on one's 
reputation within the chamber.  Work by Box-Steffensmeier and Grant (1999) find that 
legislators who are successful at passing their legislative agenda are awarded by PACs.  The 
relationship between sponsorship and consequences may be more apparent if the sponsorship 
indicator measures effectiveness, instead of a simple count, and if the consequences variable taps 
into interest group activity.   
This project—and particularly the analyses of sponsorship and agenda-setting—provides 
a good starting point for future research on legislative participation.  By making some of the 
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adjustments to the dependent variables mentioned above, the analyses in this dissertation will be 
strengthen both empirically and theoretically.  Those adjustments aside, future research on 
legislative participation (particularly the consequences of participation) need to include addition 
legislative sessions.  By using a panel research design, it will be possible to draw conclusions of 
the determinants and consequences of participation over time.  The results are less susceptible to 
external forces, and the effects of electoral margin will be easier to analyze. Furthermore, the 
comparison of election years and off-election years will provide an necessary and interesting 
dimension to the analysis.  I expect that legislators will dramatically alter their participatory 
behavior when they know they are being closely monitored by constituents, potential 
challengers, and the news media.   
This research can also serve as a bridge between prior research and future research on 
legislative and electoral reform.  An expansion of the work done by Wright (2007) on term limits 
would also help us better understand legislative participation. Wright (2007) only considers a 
single term limited state in his analysis duplicating his research across states would provide the 
necessary empirical tests to draw broader conclusions on the conditioning effects of term limits.  
How do term limits change the amount and type of legislative participation?  Building on the 
work of Hogan (2001, 2004), future research on the relationship between money, campaign 
finance reform, and legislative participation would be particularly fruitful.  Do campaign 
contributions influence participatory behavior?  Are states with more stringent campaign finance 
laws have varying levels of legislative participation?  What are the financial consequences for 
poor participatory behavior? 
In closing, this study of legislative participation at the state level provides scholars with a 
better insight on legislative behavior in general.  It is important that we develop a body of 
literature that focuses on both the determinants and consequences of participation.  In particular, 
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studying participation at the state level will help to develop and test broad theories of behavior.  
If legislators are “rational" and make decisions base on costs and benefits—costs and benefits 
that can be identified and measured across legislators and chambers – then we should be able to 
go even further in explaining legislative participation.  This dissertation serves as a building 
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